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THE CHINCH-BUG OUTBR:EAK OF 1910 TO 1915 
BY STEPHEN A. FORBES, STATE ENTOMOLOGIST 
The chinch-bug uprising of 1910-15 in Illinois was a striking ex-
ample of the power of an injurious insect to avail itself of temporarily 
favorable conditions, and, breaking thru the ordinary checks upon its 
increase, to make profitable agriculture. impossible for a term of years, 
and even to bring financial distress and ruin upon large numbers of 
those least able to bear unusual burdens. Making its first appearance 
in the fall of 1909 in a few fields of Washington county, in the south-
·western part of the state, this outbreak increased rapidly year by 
year, spread steadily from that center with no apparent reinforcement 
from any outside territory, rose in 1914 to a climax of destructive-
ness in the central part of the then infested area, 'and virtually dis-
appeared, with a rapidity amounting to collapse, in the summer of 
1915. During its widest development in the fall of 1914 it occupied in 
dt'.structive or dangerous numbers the whole of twenty-five counties, 
and a part of thirteen others. Its injuries to corn alone that year, 
as shown by statistics of crop production and price to be given in· 
detail on another page, amounted to $5,045,000 at the market price 
of that fall; and those to wheat and oats to $1,400,000 more. This 
brings the total estimated crop injury for that year to $6,400,000. 
1914 was, however, but one of five years of heavy loss in that part of 
Dlinois, and it is certain that the total for the other four years was 
at least equal to that for this year alone. We may consequently fix 
a loss of $13,000,000 as the lowest reasonable estimate for the 
period. 
Divided equally among the twenty-six counties injuriously in-
all'"' ..... "~''"" at some time during the outbreak, this average of $500,000 per 
-~.,."'"+" might not have been felt as very oppressive; and if it had been 
distributed, like a well-levied tax, over the farms of each 
....,"""'hT according to their values, it might have been borne without 
• 1en1ous distress. It was, however, so unequally divided, both locally 
personally, that it brought financial ruin to many tenant farm-
seriously embarrassed many owners of farms, led to a heavy sac-
of stock and other readily salable property, and compelled the 
~cma1~e by farmers of hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of 
and hay, necessary to maintain their working animals in the 
of the crop failure. The further economic consequences of 
disaster are being investigated in detail by a member of the de-
t of economics in the University of Illinois. 
For the first time in the history of agriculture in this state a per-
fight against the chinch-bug was made in several parts of the 
of infestation, largely by the use of organized measures for the 
ll!Bt111.ct.H.J m of the spring generation of the bugs at harvest-time. It 
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will later be shown that corn was thus saved in twenty counties in 1914 
to a value of more than $700,000, by measures costing the farmers 
about $40,000, including under this head both materials purchased 
and the value of the labor of the farmer and his hired man. It is 
certainly safe to say that other defensive operations of this and other 
years added at least $300,000 to these savings, or that, in other words, 
at least another million dollars' worth of crops would have been 
destroyed if the farmers had left them wholly without defense. 
It is the object of this paper to present a sufficiently detailed ac~ 
count _of our recent chinch-bug outbreak to show its causes and those 
of its disappearance, to compare the cost and outcome of the various 
defensive measures brought into use, and especially to show the prob-
able result if all concerned had made a general and energetic use of 
the best of these measures from the very beginning of the trouble. It 
will appear from this discussion that it is not only perfectly feasible 
to protect the corn crop completely in the beginning and early stages 
of a chinch-bug uprising, but that this is an immensely profitable un-
dertaking; that by a thoro application of measures now well known, so 
large a proportion of the chinch-bugs in any badly infested area might 
be destroyed at this time that a developing outbreak would be prac-
tically suppressed, to the great advantage of the local community and 
the substantial protection of a much larger territory adjacent. This 
would require, however, general cooperative action, taken in the com-
munity interest as well as in that of each person whose crops are 
threatened at the time. Unfortunately, however, the individual farm-
er will commonly stop short with the best protection which he can 
afford his own crops, to the neglect of the further measures necessary 
to the protection of those of his neighbors and to the protection later, 
perhaps, of those of a great area exposed to destruction if an out-
break is allowed full swing. Such an outbreak is like a contagious 
disease or a conflagration; if wholly left to individual control, 
it will run its course, with only a little saved from destruc-
tion here and there, by special personal effort. If the commun-
ity is to be protected it must be enabled to act in its own behalf 
through its official representatives, equipped and empowered to en-
courage, assist, and, where necessary, to require and even compel indi-
vidual action which will make the community interest safe. 
D ETAILED CoMPUTATION OF LossEs 
For a critical judgment of ~he amounts and values of the loss-of 
farm crops caused by the late chinch-bug outbreak, I have first taken 
the statistics of production for 1914, the year in which chinch-bug in-
jury was the most extensive and most severe, and have chosen for com-
parison the seventeen counties worst infested and seventeen other 
counties adjacent to them which were so little infested, if at all, that 
no appreciable injury was done to crops. The seventeen infested 
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counties (see Map 6) lie in a compact, roughly triangular body, with 
the Mississippi River from Randolph to Pike counties as the base of 
the triangle and Shelby county at its apex. The uninfested counties 
lie in an irregular zone around the margins of the infested area ex-
cepting, of course, on the western side. A comparison of the total 
yield and value of all crops subject to chinch-bug attack in these two 
areas in 1914 ought to show how large a deficiency should be charged 
to the chinch-bug in that year. 
It was first necessary, however, to see whether the two sets o.f 
counties were sufficiently alike in average productivity to make the 
comparison a fair one. It seemed quite possible that, altho taken at 
random, they might be enough unlike in their agricultural qualities 
and hence in their average crop yields to make it difficult to say 
whether any difference manifest in 1914 was all or mainly due to 
insect injury. To settle this point, I have taken the statistics of corn 
production for these two sets of counties for the eight years from 
1902 to 1909 inclusive-a period during which there was no chinch-
bug injury in any part of either area; and I find that corn averaged 
35 bushels per acre, during these years, in the counties which became 
infested by chinch-bugs in 1914, and 32 bushels per acre in those 
which were uninfested in that year. This difference of three bush-
els per acre being in favor of the infested area, it is evident that this 
area is at least as productive, under ordinary conditions, as the other. 
The year 1914 was one of severe and destructive drouth in central 
and southern Illinois; and it seemed possible that the two sets of 
counties selected might have differed with respect to the degree of 
drouth in a way to add a greater weather injury to that done by 
chinch-bugs, and thus to make it impossible to tell just how much was 
due to the latter alone. Reference to the published reports of the 
U. S. Weather Service, gave me nineteen points in the infested area 
at which the weather of the season was recorded, and seventeen such 
points in the uninfested area. It is generally agreed that the weather 
of June, July, and August makes the corn crop, that of August being 
the most important; and I consequently brought into comparison the 
rainfall and temperature of the two areas for these months, with the 
result that the total rainfall during these months for the infested 
counties was found to be 8.07 inches, and that for the uninfested 
counties 7.85 inches-a difference of only .22 of an inch in the three 
months, which is too small a deficiency to have any significance in this 
comparison. Moreover, an examination of the monthly means of rain-
fall for the separate months shows that the deficiency in the infested 
counties was most marked in June, when it would have had the least 
effect upon the corn crop, and least so in July, and that in August, the 
most important month for the growth of corn, the rainfall was larger 
by nearly two thirds of an inch in the infested area than in the un-
infested. 
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A similar study of the temperature records of these two sets of 
counties shows that the mean temperature of the uninfested area for 
June, July, and August, 1914, was 78.9 degrees F., and that of the 
infested area· was 79.5 degrees, the latter counties averaging only .6 
of a degree warmer than the former-a difference much too small 
to have any noticeable effect on the yield of crops. Evidently the 
weather of the season could have given no advantage to the corn 
crop of the uninfested counties. 
Thus satisfied that these two areas might be fairly compared and 
that any marked difference shown by them in the yield of crops sub-
ject to chinch-bug injury must be due to the insects themselves, I 
have compiled the reports of the 1914 corn crop, published by the 
State Department of Agriculture in its crop report for December of 
that year. From these I find that the average yield per acre in the 
infested counties was 18.1 bushels and that in the uninfested coun-
ties it was 25.2 bushels, a difference of 7.1 bushels per acre which I 
could attribute only to chinch-bug injury. Th.e total area of corn 
in the seventeen counties thus injuriously infested was, by the same 
crop report, 94 7,582 acres, and the total loss of corn at the above 
rate per acre was 6,727,432 bushels, which, at sixty cents a bushel, 
the minimum current price of corn that fall, amounted to $4,036,699. 
This, however, is not all. The December report of the State De-
partment of Agriculture shows not only the quantity of the crop 
but its quality as well, on a scale of ratios in which a fair average 
quality is rated at 100 percent. Comparing the quality ratios of the 
corn crop in our two sets of counties separately, I find that the corn 
of the infested counties was graded at 60.8 percent of an average, 
while that of the uninfested counties was 85.9 percent, a difference of 
virtually a fourth in favor of the corn of the uninfested counties. We 
shall have, therefore, to make a further reduction of fifteen cents a 
bushel in the market value of the product of the infested counties, thus 
increasing our loss of corn by a fourth, and bringing the total loss in 
1914 for these seventeen counties up to $5,045,874. 
Corn is but one of three important crops subject to destruction 
by chinch-bugs, the others being wheat and oats~ A similar use of 
the crop reports to that above described gives a yield of wheat per 
acre in 1914 of 191j2 bushels in the uninfested counties and 16 bush-
els in the infested counties, a difference of 31j2 bushels per acre at-
tributable to chinch-bug injury. The total acreage of wheat in the 
infested counties was 516,589 acres, and the average price per bushel 
August 1 was seventy-five cents. From these data we obtain a loss 
of $1,356,039 in wheat due to chinch-bug injury. The loss in oats is 
much less important. This crop in the infested counties occupied only 
16,422-acres, with an average yiel~ per acre of 6.1 bushels less than 
that in the counties uninfested. An average price of forty-one cents 
per bushel August 1 gives us a total loss of $41,071 for 1914. 
1916] CHINCH-BUG OUTBREAK 7 
.f. The loss in this year on all three crops thus amounts to $6,442,984 
by this computatio.n for seventeen counties only. Twenty-two coun-
ties were, however, injuriously infested this year, fifteen of them over 
practically their whole area and the other seven over a part of it 
only. Furthermore, 1914 was but one of six years during which the 
~ ehinch-bug was destructively abundant in this part of Illinois, and we 
~! ahall certainly be far within the truth if we double the figures for 
this limited area infested in one year as our estimate for the entire 
damage wrought in Illinois from the beginning of the outbreak. This 
-gives us practically $13,000,000 as ·the immediate sacrifice of staple 
, crops to the chinch-bug during this period in Illinois. 
;.' SECONDARY EcoNOMIC CoNSEQUENCES 
Secondary losses of all kinds consequent upon this primary destruc-
tion it is probably impossible to compute or to estimate with even ap-
~· proximate exactness; but that they were very heavy will be shown 
by a general study of the economic consequences, direct and indirect, 
immediate and remote, of this chinch-bug outbreak which is being made 
ior me by a member of the economics department of the 'University of 
Illinois. I may here refer, however, in passing, to a single example of 
~· these secondary consequences, which I have myself drawn out of the 
data derived ,from assessors' reports on the live stock of the state, as 
published by the State Department of Agriculture in its statistical 
reports. 
BJu AND DAIRY CATTLE IN FOUR WORST INFESTED COUNTIES (2724 SQUARE 
Ji KILES), AND IN FIVE UNINFESTED COUNTIES ADJACENT (2629 SQUARE MILES). 
Counties ~q. of Years Percentages 
I I 
Kindsl I 
mlles stock 1911 1 1912 1 1913 1 1914 I 1915 Loss I Gain 
Bond ..... 380 Beef 9,283 6,498 6,173 4,938 4,197 54.7 Dairy 5,632 4,506 4, 731 5,204 4, 788 15. 
----s64 Beef 10,265 9,136 8,314 7,981 6,066 40.9 --
Dairy 3,304 3,205 3,237 3,399 3·,501 5.9 
Mi'·--~-l--7-4-0 Beef 16,680 15,005 13,503 12,154 10,574 36.6 :Kadison · · · Dairy 6,332 6,142 5,528 5,362 4,826 23.8 
• fKo,._Jnt-go-m-er_y_ , __ 7_40- Beef 13,834 12,451 11,206 6,724 5,715 58.7 --
- ·----I--- Dairy 5,324 5,324 5,324 5,164 4,596 13.6 __ 
Kaeoupin 
'otal . . . . . 2,724 70,654 62,267 58,016 50,926 44,263 37.0 
Beef 6,425 4,305 3,440 2,993 2,993 51.8 I 513 Dairy 2,664 2,531 2,278 2,278 2,210 13.3 
1ft..-,, ---l·-5-20- Beef 9,837 8,066 7,421 6,679 5,544 43.6 --~188 '· • • • • Dairy 3,464 3,014 2,924 3,070 3,070 11.4 
tL----,be-rl-a-nd-.1• - 3-50- Beef 9,370 7,027 6,324 6,134 6,441 31.3 --~~ Dairy 1,993 1,594 1,674 1,758 1,899 4.7 
ilfR-... -",--I·-4-86- Beef 11,350 10,782 10,.027 8,523 8,097 ~ --
r-'"t'ham · · Dairy 6,472 6,472 6,472 6,343 6,153 4.9 
~,__-;y-.. -. -. . ':_7_6_0 ~~f 277,~2788 257,~7682 2~,~*~ 2~,~77~ 2*,~~~ ~.8 --
----1--- auy ' ' ' ' ' __ .- --
~ . . . . . 2,629 86,281 74,131 74,679 70,827 68,538 20.6 
~----~~-~-~~-~----
a. 
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SUMMARY OF ABOVE TABLE 
Decline 
Cattle Counties 1911 1915 in 
numbers percent 
Beef Uninfested 64,310 47,976 16,334 25.4 
Infested 50,062 26,552 23,510 46.9 
Dairy Uninfested 21,971 20,562 1,409 6.4 
Infested 20,592 17,711 2,881 13.8 
Decline in four counties because of chinch-bug injury to crops: Beef cattle, 
7176 (21.5%); dairy cattle, 1472, (7.4%) . 
Value of decline: Beef cattle, ................................. . .... $358,800 
Dairy cattle, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,320 
$447,120 
To arrive at the effect of a destruction of crops by the chinch-
bug upon live-stock holdings in the infested coun:try, I have brought 
into comparison the number of beef and dairy cattle in infested and 
uninfested- counties for a period of four years from 1911, when the 
counties chosen were generally invaded by the chinch-bug, to 1915, 
when the invasion came to an end. The infested counties selected 
were Bond, Macoupin, Madison, and Montgomery, with a total area 
of 2724 square miles, and the uninfested countries were Clark, Coles, 
Cumberland, Effingham, and Shelby, with a total area of 2629 square 
miles. From the foregoing table it will be seen that there was a fall-
jng off from 1911 to 1915 in the number of ·cattle of both classes in 
both groups of counties, but that this decline went much the farthest 
in the counties infested by the chinch-bug. vVhile the uninfested 
counties lost 25.4 percent of their beef cattle and 6.4 percent of their 
dairy cows in these four years, the infested counties lost 46.9 percent 
of the former and 13.8 percent of the latter- differences of 21.5 per-
cent of their beef and 7.4 percent of their dairy animals-all of which 
may be fairly attributed to the pinch of the emergency caused by the 
chinch-bug devastation. These ratios give us a loss on this account 
of 7176 beef cattle and 1472 dairy cows, which, at the average values 
of stock in the several counties for the year 1915 ($47 for beef and 
$60 for dairy animals) amounts to $447,120. It is not to be under-
stood, of course, that this sum should be added to the losses due to 
the chinch-bug; it is merely a partial measure of the economic dis-
turbance and strain which these losses produced. 
THE PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTBREAK 
From its beginning in the southwestern part of Washington county 
in 1909, the chinch-bug outbreak expanded in 1910 to occupy an irreg-
ularly pear-shaped area lying on both sides of the Kaskaskia River 
and including virtually the whole of the counties of Clinton, Wash-
ington, and Perry together with a considerable part of six other coun-
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ties adjacent. The northernmost locality in which an infestation was 
found was in the northern part of Fayette county. (Map 1.) 
By the summer of 1911 the smaller, northern end of this pear-
shaped area had so developed to the north and west as to m~ke a much 
larger district of infestation, still pear-shaped, but with the larger end 
of the figure now northward. Fourteen counties were involved, seven 
of them lying wholly within the infested area, the northern boundary 
of which reached to the southern part of Christian county and the 
northern line of Macoupin. A tendency of the expansion to the east-
ward was shown by threatening numbers of chinch-bugs atJ single lo-
calities in Franklin and Jasper countries. (Map 2.) 
During 1912 the infested district was widened and extended north-
ward to assume a triangular form, with ·the Mississippi R~ver between 
Jackson and Pike counties as one side of the triangle and with Cum-
berland county at its peak. (Map 2.) Eleven counties were now 
wholly included in it, and a considerable part of twelve counties ad-
ditional. The northernmost point of serious infestation this season was 
in the southern fourth of Sangamon county. The severity of the at-
tack was noticeably lessened in the southernmost counties infested; 
altho local crop injury in Hamilton and Saline counties showed that 
conditions to the southeast were barely below the danger line. 
In 1913, (Map 3) altho there was a slight expansion of the area 
of injury to the northward to include the whole of Greene and Cal-
houn counties, the number of counties affected was reduced to eighteen, 
the southern and eastern angles of the area occupied in 1912 being 
now withdrawn or rounded off in a way to give the whole tract an ir-
regularly hemispherical or semielliptical form with the central parts 
of Shelby and Marion counties at its eastern boundary and central 
Randolph at its southernmost extension. 
There had developed by this time in parts of Madison and Ma-
coupin counties a center of intense infestation within which nearly all 
crops liable to destruction were practically obliterated; and these 
conditions became still more serious in 1914 when the outbreak reached 
it!! climax. In this year, (1914) the spring flights of chinch-bugs from 
their winter quarters brought them to our notice as destructively 
abundant either in wheat or corn over the whole of fifteen counties 
and in considerable parts of eleven others, the additions to the area 
oecupied being almost wholly to the northward. (Map 4.) The north-
ernmost line of the chinch-bug territory of this year ran a little above 
the southern boundaries of Adams, Brown, and Cass counties; and its 
farthest eastern boundary was in Effingham county. A center of vir-
tually complete destruction lay in the counties of Jersey, Macoupin, 
llontgomery, Fayette, Bond, and Madison, within which it formed 
an oval tract about seventy-five by forty miles in greatest length and 
breadth. The mid-summer flight of the first generation of the bugs 
carried them so far outward in all directions that the fall inspection 
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MAP 4. Area dangerously infested in fall of 1914, with central area of vir-
tually complete destruction that season. 
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ILLINOIS 
MAP 5. Area found dangerously infested in May, 1915. 
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of my field assistants gave us a list of forty counties dangerously in-
fested, twenty-five of them over virtually their whole area. (Map 5.) 
As a matter of fact, by the first week in May of 1915 chinch-bugs 
were reported dangerously abundant in wheat over the whole or nearly 
the whole of the following twenty-nine counties,- Adams, Brown, 
Cass, Menard, Pike, Scott, Morgan, Sangamon, Macon, Calhoun, 
Greene, Jersey, Macoupin, Montgomery, Christian, Moultrie, Shelby, 
:Madison, Bond, Fayette, Effingham, St. Clair, Clinton, Marion, Mon-
roe, Washington, J efferson, Randolph, and Perry, and in parts of the 
following eleven others,- Mason, Schuyler, Fulton, Logan, Piatt, 
Douglas, Coles, Cumberland, Jasper, Clay, and Wayne (Map· 6). Ex-
traordinarily heavy beating rains in May and June so far reduced the 
numbers . of the insects that by the 20th of June, 1915, all danger of 
an outbreak was over for the year and the office force organized for a 
field campaign was called in and broken up. · 
LocAL AND GENERAL CAUSES OF THE OuTBREAK 
The original causes of the outbreak we are studying, of its con-
tinued increase for six successive years, of its extension northward 
and its restriction and even retreat in the south and east, and those of 
its final disappearance, are to be ascertained only by careful inquiry 
into the conditions by which it was preceded, in the midst of which it 
arose, under which it was maintained, and by which it was surrounded. 
Such an inquiry must of course take into account all that we definitely 
know or may intelligently surmise concerning the effects of weather, 
soil, crops, parasites, predaceous enemies, and contagious diseases upon 
the rate of insect multiplication. 
The weather relation may be very briefly described. Unusually warm 
weather, continued thru each year's breeding season of the bugs-that 
is, from May to August inclusive-and the absence of heavy beating 
rains during this period of the hatching and growth of the young, es-
pe('.ially during June and August, are conditions generally regarded 
as favorable to a high rate of increase; while weather cooler than nor-
mal during the late spring and summer, accompanied by an abundance 
of rain falling in beating storms in late May, June, and August, but 
especially in June, may put an end to a destructive outbreak in a sin-
gle year. The crop relation may be described with equal brevity. Fav-
orable weather conditions will take first effect, other things being ap-
proximately equal, in an area where the crops are most largely those 
upon which the chinch-bug can maintain itself-that is, the cereal 
crops and the forage grasses-and where those crops are so massed 
and so distributed that the bugs can easily find their way to wheat in 
spi.·ing and to oats and corn at and soon after the time of the wheat 
harvest. It is also commonly believed that an outbreak is most likely 
to appear in Illinois where a sufficient acreage of winter wheat is so 
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well distributed as to furnish abundant pasturage to the adult bugs 
when they scatter abroad from their winter quarters, and to the young 
of the first generation hatching in the field to which their parents have 
been drawn for food. 
By an examination of the records of the U. S. Weather Bureau and 
the datru of crop prcduction in southern Illinois for 1907, 1908, and 
1909, as published by the State Department of Agriculture, I am led 
to the conclusion that an immediate cause of the beginning of the 
Washington county outbreak was the warm weather of the spring and 
summer of 1908 and 1909 and the character of the farm crops pre-
dominating in the country where the trouble began. 
The U. S. Weather Bureau stations nearest the fields in which the 
chinch-bug was first noticed in 1909 were those at Tilden and Sparta, 
in the northeastern part of Randolph county, the first close to the 
southwest corner of Washington ·county and the second about six 
miles farther south. The weather records were taken at Tilden up to 
1909 and at Sparta thereafter. The average temperature and rainfall 
data here for the four months from May to August inclusive are given 
in the following table. The minus sign before a number indicates de-
grees of temperature or inches of rainfall below the normal for the sta-
tion, and a plus sign indicates degrees or inches above the normal. 
TOTAL DEPARTURES FROM NORMAL TEMPERATURE AND R AINFALL, MAY TO AUGUST, 
1907-1911, R ANDOLPH Co., ILL. 
Year I Temperature I Rain Remarks 
1907 - 5.4 +3.47 Cool and wet 
1908 + 5.1 +3.17 Warm and wet 
1909 + 4.2 -0.26 Warm and normal 
1910 -10.1 +3.24 Very cool and wet 
1911 +10.4 -6.13 Very warm and very dry 
It will be seen that 1907 was a year unfavorable to chinch-bug in-
erease, being both cool and wet, althO' the change to warmer weather 
began in midsummer of that year, July and August averaging 1.5 de-
grees above the normal. 1908 opened with an early spring, the mean 
temperature of March being 6.8 degrees above the normal, and it con-
tinued warm until October, except for a drop to normal temperature 
in June and July. In· 1909, June and August were warm in Ran-
dolph county, the excess temperature of August especially rising to 
a mean of 4.2 degrees. This, with a shortage of 3.12 inches in the 
rainfall of that month, when young chinch-bugs of the second genera-
tion were hatching in the corn, seems to have been the match which 
set off the explosion, for it was in the corn fields of that fall that the 
ehinch-bug was first noticed in extraordinary abundance. The fol-
lowing spring it reached numbers to do considerable injury to wheat, 
and later in the season to corn also, in at least nine counties, as al-
ready reported. The extent and amount of injury by chinch-bugs 
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in 1910 maites it very likely that infestation actually began over much 
of this area of injury in 1909, and farther on in tracing the relations 
of the outbrea~ to prevailing crops I have assumed that this was the 
tact. 
How little a deficient rainfall can have had to do with the com-
mencement of this outbreak is shown by the fact that there was no 
.dry summer in this distr ict during these years until 1911, that of 
1909 being virtually normal. as to rainfall, and May to August in 
1907, 1908, and 1910 being decidedly wet in Randolph county, with 
an excess of rainfall varying from 31j5 to 31f2 inches for each of these 
three years. · 
At this point the inquiry will naturally arise whether there were 
not other places in southern Illinois where the spring and summer 
weather of these years was equally favorable t o a rapid multiplication 
of the chinch-bug, but where nothing of the sort actually occurred. 
As an answer to this question I have prepared the following table 
comparing temperatures and rainfall at the southern Illinois stations 
in 1908 and 1909. From this it will be seen that both Flora and Cob-
den, in Clay and Union counties, show conditions quite as favorable 
to the chinch-bug as those at Tilden, in that the breeding months 
were warm and dry at both the former in 1908, and warm at both in 
1909 with a rainfall a little below the normal at Flora and less than 
an inch above the normal at Cobden. 
DEPARTURE FROM NORMAL T EMPERATURE AND R AINFALL, S OUTHERN ILLINOIS STA· 
TIONS, M AY TO A UGUST, 1908- 09 
I 
1908 I 1909 
Weather st ations Temperature, ! Rain, Temperature, ~ Rain, 
degrees inches degrees inches 
A~lb~io-n---.. -.-. -.. -.-.-. -. . - .-.-.. -.-. -.---~+~2'. 6~~----2~.9~6------~0~.6~~--~+~0~.5=7--
Cobden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +L4 --3.50 +4.5 +0.86 
Flora .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . + 5.5 --3.50 +3.8 - 0.18 
Greenville. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3.4 +4.91 + 0.5 -0.64 
McLeansboro . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 --2.45 + 1.5 -1.~1 
Mt. Vernon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +4.0 --1.88 + 1.8 +0.65 
Olney . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. +L9 --1.37 --1.3 +1.31 
St. John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --2.9 --0.04 + 2.7 -0.35 
Tilden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +5.1 +3.17 + 4.2 -0.26 · 
------ ----~------~--------~-------------
Evidently there must have been something other than the weather a 
of these two years to prevent the appearance of destructive numbers 
of the chinch-bug in the districts around these two stations. It is 
when we compare the three counties with regard to their agricultural 
conditions, that we find differences having an important bearing on our 
inquiry. 
Clay county differed from Was_hington county in 1909 especially 
in . the smaller percentage of its area in wheat ( 1 percent in Clay 
county and 12.6 percent in Washington) , and in the smaller area in 
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RATIO OF THE AREA IN EACH CROP TO THE AREA IN ALL THE CEREAL AND FORAGE 
CROPS TAKEN TOGETHER 
Counties I 
Wheat 
I Oats I 
Corn 
I 
Forage 
percent percent percent percent 
1 Washington ..... . ... ..... . ... .. ... ·1 35.3 
I 
16.7 
I 
26.1 
I 
21.5 
Clay ..• • ... .... .... . . . . .... ........ 3.9 10.2 43.2 42.7 
Union . ....... . ....... . .. . . . ....... 32.2 5.3 25.3 37.3 
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL AREA OF EACH COUNTY IN EACH CROP 
Counties I Wheat I Oats I Corn I Forage I Totals I percent percent percent percent 
Washington ..... . ... ..... . . ·1 12.6 
I 
6.1 
I 
9.1 
I 
7.7 
I 
35.5 
Clay ....... . ..... . .. . ..... . 1.0 2.8 11.7 11.3 26.8 
Union ...... . ... . . .. .. . ..... 8.6 1.4 6.8 10 .. 0 26.8 
ACRES IN CEREAL AND FORAGE CROPS IN WASHINGTON, CLAY, AND UNION COUNTIES 
IN 1909 
Washington 
~eat . .......... . . . ............. . . ~~
Oats.·· ··········· · ········ · ······· · 21
1
793 
Corn... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33:289 
J?asture .... . ........ . . . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,915 
Hay... ...... . .... .... .. . ... .. .. ... . 7,609 
127,647 
TOTAL ARE.\S IN ACRES 
Clay 
3,106 
8,233 
35,011 
17,945 
16,675 
- 80,970-
Washington I Clay · 
Total areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~.>5,480 298,240 
Areas under cultivation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~64 ,837 228,469 
Percentage cultivated . .. .. .. .. .. .... l---74- .. .,-3 -1 76.6 
Union 
22,116 
3,563 
17,450 
19,385 
6,251 
68,7~ 
Union 
256,000 
132,084 
51.6 
crops on which the chinch-bug can live ar .. J breed (26.8 percent in 
Clay and 35.5 percent in Washington). Union county, on the other 
hand, differed from Washington in the fact that it had only about two 
thirds as large a ratio of its area under cultivation (51.6 percent to 
74.3 percent), two third~ as much of its area in wheat (8.6 percent to 
12.6 percent), and a little more than one fifth as much in oats (1.4 
percent to 6.1). Otherwise stated, Washington county had nearly 19 
percent, and Union county only 10 percent, of their total areas in 
those crops on which the chinch-bug depends mainly for food 1n 
spring. Union county also differs from Washington in its hilly and 
broken character, the cultivated fields being much more scattered and 
l 
isolated. · 
This brings us to a general consideration of the effects of the kinds 
and distribution of crops on a chinch-bug infestation as shown in the 
location and progress of this outbreak. For ari investigation of this 
mbject I have brought together the crop data for 1909 and 1910 of 
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nine counties within the area seriously infested in those years, and 
of nine other counties adjacent, but not infested at that time, as 
shown 1n the tables following. 
CROP AREAS, 1909, INFESTED COUNTIES 
-
Counties Wheat Oats I Corn Forage 
-
Madison .............. 63,820 5,881 67,767 73,228 
Bond ................ 14,406 9,025 27,798 48,742 
Fayette ............. . 16,457 7,948 31,682 77,567 
Marion ............... 819 4,306 26,298 56,376 
Clinton ............. .. 37,530 24,059 46,156 47,297 
St. Clair .............. . 59,789 2,922 39,667 47,898 
Randolph .............. 54,384 1,547 24,530 31,248 
Washington ........... . 44,777 21,793 35,619 27,524 
Perry ................ 28,288 10,434 16,784 15;726 
Totals ........... a20,21o 87,915 31G,301 . 425,666 
-
Total of above crops . ........................................ 1,150,152 acres 
Total of cultivated land . . ............ · ........................ 2,296,263 acres 
Total area ............................................ . ..... 3,284,480 acres 
Ratio of acreage of each crop to total acreage of all above crops :-wheat, 27.8 
percent; oats, 7.6 percent ; corn, 27.5 percent; forage, 37 percent. 
Ratio of area in above crops to total area of cultivated land, ·5.0 percent. 
Ratio of cultivated land to total area, 70 percent. 
Percentage of total area in each crop ·:-wheat, 9.7; ·oats, 20; corn, 9.6; forage, 13; 
total, 34.3. 
CROP AREAS, 1909, UNINFESTED COUNTIES 
Counties Wheat Oats Corn Forage 
---- -
Effingham . ..... ........ 4,422 9,935 48,732 56,394 
Jasper ............... 286 982 19,582 14,065 
Richland ............. . 993 7,694 19,755 48,490 
Clay ................. 3,089 8,233 35,011 34,620 
Wayne . . ............. . 684 1,031 39,709 62,549 
Jefferson ............. . 2,983 8,379 24,983 51,231 
Hamilton ............. 360 9,247 47,342 33,299 
Franklin ............. 1,148 12,687 30,615 32,376 
Williamson ........... 2,660 6,986 35,560 
I 
20,307 
Totals ........... 16,625 65,174 301,289 353,331 
Total of above crops ....................... . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736,419 acres 
Total of cultivated land ...................................... 2,033,114 acres 
Total area .................................................. 2,759,6&0 acres 
Ratio of acreage of each crop to total acreage of all above crops :-wheat, 2.3 per· 
cent; oats, 8.9 percent; corn, 40.9 percent; forage, 4 7.9 percent. 
Ratio of area in above crops to total area of cultivated land, 36.2 percent. 
Ratio of cultivated land to total area, 73.7 percent. 
Percentage of total area in each crop: wheat, 0.6 percent; oats, 2.3 percent; com, 
11.0 percent; forage, 12.8 percent; total, 26.7 percent. 
From these tables it will be seen that the nine infested counties have 
an area of about three and a quarter millions of acres·, of which 50 per-
cent was in the cereal crops and the forage grasses (the chinch-bug 
crops, in other words), and that nearly 28 percent of the area of these 
crops was in wheat, about the same· in corn, 7.6 percent in oats, and 37 
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percent in hay and pasture land. It would have been difficult indeed 
to plan a cropping of these counties better calculated to breed and 
nourish the chinch-bug during a time favorable to its rapid increase. 
With an abundance of wheat for the first generation and of corn for 
the second, with oats enough to ease the way from the one crop to the 
other after the wheat harvest, with a large area in the ·permanent 
grasses available at all times as an emergency food when the more 
succulent cereals were wanting, and with weather favorable to a large 
production of eggs and a successful hatching and rapid growth of the 
yo;ung; it was no miracle that brought the chinch-bugs out in un-
manageable numbers. 
In the nine uninfested counties, on the other hand, with an area 
of two and three quarters millions of acres, we see in the smaller per-
centage of the chinch-bug crops ( 36.2 percent here as against 50 
·percent in the other counties) and especially in a ratio of winter wheat 
only about one twelfth that of the infested counties (2.3 percent as 
against 27.8 percent), at least a partial explanation of the freedom of 
these counties from chinch-bug attack. 
It was rather unfortunate for southern Illinois that wheat was a 
peculiarly tempting crop · at the time when the agriculture of the re-
gion was threatened with ruin by an insect which finds in an abund-
ance of wheat its most favorable food. The price of wheat in 1909 led 
to an increased acreage in that crop in 1910, even in the infested and 
endangered counties. In our nine infested counties the area in wheat 
rose from 27.8 percent in 1909 to 31 percent in 1910, the other crop 
areas being diminished a little or remaining virtually unchanged. In 
the nine uninfested counties the change was still greater, from 2.3 
percent in wheat in 1909 to 7.3 percent in 1910, oats also coming up 
here from 8.9 percent to 12.4 percent, the corn and forage grasses 
falling off proportionally. The total acreage of the chinch-bug crops 
increased in these uninfested counties from 36.2 percent (1909) to 42 
percent (1910). The contrast in crops between these groups of coun-
ties continued marked in 1910, however, in respect to the area in 
wheat, which was more than four times as large in the infested coun-
ties as it was in the uninfested. 
CROP AREAS, 1910, INFESTED COUNTIES 
Counties Wheat Oats Corn Forage 
=B-on-;;d-. -. -•. -. -. -.. - .-. -•• - .-. -. -•. -'------=-1-=-9 ,-=o-=-16::.----''-----1::-:0:-c,3:::-:7=9---'---;:;2,.-;-4,462 46,716 
Clinton • . • • • • • . • • • . . • • . 20,165 10,290 14,870 15,583 
Fayette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,914 8,504 33,900 76,858 
Madison . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 65,100 6,234 67,767 70,228 
Marion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 4,737 28,928 49,968 
Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,117 11,686 17,959 14,485 
Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54,384 1,624 24,530 30,516 
St. Clair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,985 2,805 38,477 40,047 
_w_a--:sh=in-:'gt'----=-on __ · ·_·_· _. -_· ·_·_· _. ·...,.--:::-:::4-=5,'-=6-=7 a=-· -....,.-----,c21, 79:;-:3:=----;-----:;::-:3;-;;:2-'-:;, 7=6=9 -;--;;:-;;;-26-=-'=14-;-;8:---
Totals .... .. ..... ·I 330,255 78,052 283,662 370,549 
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Totals of above crops ... ... ... ... . . .. ....... . ...... .. .... .... 1,062,518 acres 
Total of cultivated land ....................................... 2,296,263 acres 
Total area ................... . ........... .. ........ .... ..... 3,284,480 acres 
Ratio of acreage of each crop to total acreages of all above crops: wheat, 31 
percent; oats, 7.3 percent; corn, 26.7 percent; forage, 34.9 percent. 
R.atio of area in above crops to total area of cultivated land, 52 percent. 
R.atio of cultivated land to total area, 70 percent. 
Ratio of area of each crop to total area: wheat, 10 percent; oats, 2.4 percent; corn, 
8.6 percent; forage, 11.3 percent; total, 32.3 percent. 
CROP AREAS, 1910, UNINFESTED COUNTIES 
Oats I Corn 
9,056 33,260 
45,417 44,888 
13,829 31,840 
10,911 44,975 
1,129 18,995 
9,887 24,483 
8,771 20,743 
1,217 42,489 
5,705 36,649 
105,922 I 298,322 
Total of above crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,050 acres 
Total . of cultivated land .......... .......... .. .. .. .. .......... 2,033,114 acres ,~ 
Total area .................................................. 2,759,680 acres 
Ratio of acreage of each crop to total acreage of all above crops :-wheat, 7.3 
percent; oats, 12.4 percent; corn, 35 percent; forage, 45.3 percent. 
Ratio of area in above crops to total area of cultivated land, 42 percent. 
Ratio of cultivated land to total area, 73.7 percent. 
Ratio of area of each crop to t otal area : wheat, 2.2 percent; oats, 3.8 percent; 
corn, 10.8 percent; forage, 14 percent; total, 30.8 percent. 
As another method of ascertaining the effect of the kind of crop-
ping upon the extension of chinch-bug injury, I have brought into 
comparison the crop areas in 1911 of four counties adjacent to the in-
fested area which were not themselves infested in this year but . were 
invaded by the chinch-bug in the year following, and those of four 
other counties adjacent which were not infested in either year. 
(Map 2.) For convenience of discussion, I will call the four counties 
not subsequently infested (Clay, Franldin, Jackson, and Jefferson) 
Group A, and the four subsequently infested counties (Jersey, 
Macoupin, Madison, and Montgomery) Group B. The following table 
is the basis of my comparison. 
CROP AREAS, 1911 
Counties, Group A (not infested) 
Clay ................................. I W:,~~~ l-~~;;-~-;::;:7;;-:s 9;;- I --;;:;-;9;-;~~:;-;::;-;4-
Franklin......... ..... . .. ... .. ....... 1,128 13,414 30,248 
Jackson.............................. 20,794 750 13,321 
Jefferson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,872 9,096 21,300 
----1·----
Forage 
31,810 
31,565 
15,722 
50,:346 
Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,381 31,139 94,803 129,443 
. 
'-' 
£ . 
!: 
... 
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Counties, Group B (subsequently infested) 
Jersey .. 
Macoupi 
.............. ....... ... .. .. ·I ~.~~7 o~;~o I -~~;~6 -~~ 
n... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2~ .844 10.427 41.280 51:17::3 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 
1):).100 6.047 69 .122 70.029 Madison . 
.Montgom ery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,275 22,712 70,383 80,707 
Totals 0 • • 0 ••••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 144.046 ' ~6 215.071 221,877 
Acreage in above crops : 
G roup A, 287,766 acres 
GI ·oup B 621 040 '' 
Cultivate d area,' 1911: ' 
G roup A, 83 7, 7 49 acres 
G roup B, 1,036,956 ' ' 
A=coun t ies north of infested area of 1911; i1lfe~teu in 1912 . 
B=coun ties southeast of infested area of 1911; not infested in 1912. 
Cno p R ATIOS, _1911 (R.A'l'IO OF AREA IN E ACH C RO P 'TO TOTAL AREA UNDER 
CULTIVAT!Ol'\ ) 
GI ·oup Wheat Oat s Corn Forage 
A 
B 
3.86 % 
13.9 % 
3.71 o/o 
3.8 o/o 
11.3% 
20.8 % 
15.4% 
21.4% 
Fro m this t able we see that the area in chinch-bug crops was 
maHer in Group A (34.3 percent) than in Group B (59.9 per-
and that the ratio of wheat in Group B was three and a half 
s great as in Group A . In other '\vords, the outbreak extended 
much s 
crnt), 
times a 
from t 
to cere 
he area infested in 1911 northward over country planted largely 
als and grasses, and with a high ratio of wheat, but did not 
over counties to the east and southeast with a smaller area in 
hinch-bug crops and a materially smaller one in wheat. 
spread 
these c 
An other reason appears, however, for this rapid northward spread 
chinch-bug outbreak, in a fact brought especially to my atten-of the 
tion b 
chinch-
y one of my field assistants, 1VIr. W. P. F lint. The principal 
bug flights-the dispersal flights-are those which carry the 
over new territory in spring when it emerges f rom its winter 
rs, in midsummer when the first generation reaches maturity, 
insect 
quarte 
and in fall when the insect leaves the fields in search of winter quar-
The principal spring and fall flights are especially likely to ters. 
occur 
under 
upon warm days following upon raw and chilly ones, conditions 
which the prevailing winds are from the south. 
Thi s fact is illustrated by the following data of the direction and 
y of the wind at Springfield at times when our field notes show 
currences of considerable flights of chinch-bugs in the infested 
velocit 
the oc 
area. 
t 
-/ 
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Date Direction of wind Velocity 
M ay 4, 1911 West 13 miles, maximum 
" 5, " East and southeast 12 miles, " 
" 6, " South 12 miles, " 
" 7, " South · 15 miles, " s ept. 25, " Variable 
" 26, " Northeast around to south 
" 
27, " South and southwest A pril 24, 1912 Southwest and west 18 miles, 
M ay 1, '' South and southwest 22 '' 
" 
C) 
" Southeast and east 21 " 
'"'' 
'' 3, " Southeast and south 14 " 
" 4, 
,, South and southeast 18 " A pril 18, 191:1 West and northwest 18 '' 
" 21, " South 19 " 
" 22, '' South and southwest 25 " 
" 23, " South 31 " 
" 16, 1914 West and southwest 8 " 
" 16, '' South and southwest 11 " 
" 18, " South 36 " s ept. 20, " Southeast and south 16 " 
" 21, " South 21 " 
It is a matter of common observation that the chinch-bug tends to 
move with the wind, even when on the ground, and much more so, of 
course, when on the wing. The wider and more rapid extension of 
an outbreak to the north than in any other direction is a necessary 
consequence; and the later stages of the spread of .the present one 
into the northernmost counties of its area seems, indeed, to have been 
due mainly to this cause. Altho continuing much the most destructive 
in the distinctively wheat-growing counties, it invaded counties to the 
northward in which wheat was a relatively unimportant crop. In 
, 1913, for example, it spread to the north over the greater part of the 
counties of Christian and Sangamon, the cropping of which, as shown 
below, gives us but 9.8 percent of their area in wheat in 1912 and 7.6 
percent in 1913. Corn was, in fact, the predominating crop in these 
counties, with the forage plants next in area and oats averaging only 
about as much as wheat .. 
CRoP .AREAS, 1912 
Counties Wheat Oats Corn Forage 
Christian .............. . 18,059 5,846 109,303 74,915 
San gam on ............. 21,136 29,196 99,596 41,581 
Totals ............ 39,195 35,042 208,899 116,496 
Total of above crops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399,632 aeree 
Total area .................................................. 1,009,280 aeres 
Total in cereal and forage crops 39.6 percent of area. 
Ratio of each crop to total of above crops: wheat, 9.8 percent; oats, 8.8 percent; 
corn, 52.3 percent; forage, 29.1 percent. 
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As a general conclusion from the foregoing discussion we may say 
that our outbreak made its start in the wheat-growing counties under 
conditions of high spring and summer temperatures for two succes-
sive seasons, but with no marked deficiency of rainfall; that it spread 
thence by a process of overflow in the direction of the prevailing winds 
at the times of the dispersal flights of the bugs, and into wheat-growing 
counties to the virtual exclusion of those in which wheat was not an im-
portant crop; that it reached its most destructive abundance in wheat 
country to the northward of its place of origin; and that it was 
finally swept in this direction into areas where wheat is decidedly 
secondary to corn, hay, and pasture grasses, doing there a diminished 
damage, ho·wever, except to corn which grew beside infested fields of -
wheat. 
It .must be admitted, however, that proof of the immediate de-
pendence of thinch-bug increase on high summer temperatures and 
moderate rainfall and upon the character of the agricultural crops, 
is not here so Clean-cut and positive as to put these conclusions alto-
gethe~ beyond question. A great chinch-bug outbreak is, as a rule, 
general over a wide territory-the present one, for example, -covering 
the greater part of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri, besides some 
forty counties in Illinois. It began, indeed, earlier in the West than 
in Illinois itself, chinch-bugs being destructive there in the spring of 
1907, more than two years before our first observation of its preva-
lence in this state. The occurrence and maintenance, for a term of 
years, of any uniform weather conditions over so great an area seems 
quite improbable; and the problem is one which should at any rate 
be studied over the entire territory of an outbreak as a unit rather 
than in a fragment of it on its margin. Furthermore, all our conclu-
sions are based on field observations only, and are wanting in the 
precision and conclusive character of experimental investigation. Just 
how varying temperatures affect the chinch-bug; at which degree of 
heat it becomes active; how high a temperature is most advantageous 
to it, and at what degree is begins to suffer; how long a season is most 
nducive to its rapid multiplication; and what are the effects upon it 
of different degrees of humidity at varying temperatures,-these are 
all questions which must be answered before a complete solution of 
the problem of meteorological relations can be -reached. 
The sensitiveness of the chinch-bug to differences of temperature 
is well shown by its habits in the field when it is attempting to escape 
m the dried-up stubble after harvest. It does not ordinarily begin 
its movements in the forenoon until the weather of the day warms up 
to about 74 degrees F.,• and on hot bright days its activities cease in 
*Upon this point the following :field-notes by Mr. Flint for the summer of 
1912 have an interesting bearing: 
''The temperature at which chinch-bugs, assembled just within the road-oil 
Jine, begin to move in the· forenoon was noticed on several days. They were never 
n in motion when the thermometer was below 74 degrees F., and no effort to ea-
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the middle of the day from 10 or 11 o'clock until 3 or 4 in the after-
noon, the bugs sheltering themselves meantime against the heat as 
best they can. As night approaches they become · quiet again, and 
they make no migration movements after twilight falls. 
THE ARREST OF THE OUTBREAK IN 1915 
Effect of the Weather.-Whatever uncertainty may attach to our 
judgments of the principal causes of the origin and continuance of OUJ' 
chinch-bug uprising, there can be none as to those of its suppression 
in 1915, as will be seen from the following narrative abstracted from . 
the notes of Mr. W. P. Flint, in charge of ·my field operations during 
that year. 
Examinations of chinch-bugs in their winter quarters during the 
lat ter part of March, 1915, and counts of living and dead bugs, showed 
that only a very small percentage of them had died during the winter. 
rrhruout the greater part of the infested area they were active in their 
places of hibernation during the warm days from the 5th to the 9th 
of April, but few or none flew into wheat fields at this time. During a 
second warm period, beginning April 16, a general flight into the 
fields began, and by the 25th of that month nearly all the bugs were in 
i he wheat or the oats. 
Eggs were very abundant in the wheat by April 28 in the central 
part of the infested area, and by the first week in May in the northern 
part also, but owing to cool and rainy weather, beginning in most sec-
tions about May 3, their hatching was much delayed. Fifteen collec-
tions of the eggs brought in from the field before May 11 hatched, on 
an average, twenty-eight and a half days thereafter, and some not 
until forty-three days after they were brought in. 
Young bugs were first noticed in the fields May 17, but they were 
not at all abundant until the end of May. From May 20 to 30 very 
hard beating rains fell over the whole infested area. At Springfield 
the total rainfall from May 25 to 27 was 6.26 inches, and it was nearly 
as great at sever-al other places. These rains caused the death of 
most of the adult chinch-bugs in that part of the infested area. Dead 
cape from the stubble fields surrounded by barriers was ordinarily made until 
al)out the middle of the forenoon. More detailed data are as follows: 
"July 18, 1!H2. The mQrning bright and very clear ; temperature at 5:30 
a. m., 66 degrees, no movement of the bugs; 6 a. m., tempera ture 68.5 degrees, no 
movement; 7 a. m., temperature 7 4 degrees, slight movement among such of the 
chinch-bugs as ·were directly exposed to the rays of the sun; 7:30 a. m., tempera· 
hue 78 degrees, sli ght general mo\'ement in fi eld and in post -hole traj>s, but no 
hugs crawling to the road-oil line. July 19. Morning bright and clear; tempera-
ture, 5: 30 a. m., 61 degrees F ., no movement; 6 a. m., 64 degrees, no movement; 
7 a. m., 70 degrees, no movement; 7: 30 a. m., 76 degrees, slight movement amnng 
the bugs, altho no real effort was made to leave the :fielu.'' 
According to afternoon observations, recorded in Bulletin 191 of the Kan-
sas Agricultural Experiment Station, it appears that in the dry cloudless weather 
of 1911 and 1912 ''the bugs usually began to escape about 4 p. m., reaching the 
maximum from 5 to 5 :30, and usually ending by 7 p. m. '' 
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bugs were numerous. on the ground in all infested fields, some showing 
the white fungus of Sporotrichum, but many with no trace of that 
or any other fungous growth. At least 95 to 99 percent of the young 
bugs that had hatched before May 25 were killed by these beating 
rains. In all the more heavily infested fields the ground around the 
wheat plants looked as if sprinkled with red pepper because of the 
abundance of young bugs imbedded there in the mud; and in only 
one instance did these dead young give any evidence of fungous in-
fection. Where streams rose and flooded bottomland wheat in a way 
to leave the tops of the plants projecting above the flood, the bugs 
availed themselves of this means of escape from the waters, climbing 
the stems and remaining until the ground was exposed again, and then 
returning to the bases of the· wheat plants. 
The period of egg-hatching extended from May 20 to June 20. It 
was difficult to say just when the young were most abundant in the 
fiPlds, the weather for nearly all May and June being an alternation 
of short moderately warm periods, during which the eggs hatched in 
fair numbers, and heavy rains which the young were too small and 
weak to survive. There were thus alternating periods of a moderate 
abundance and unusual scarcity of the young in all the central and 
northern parts of the infested area ; and by June 20 all danger of 
serious injury by chinch-bugs in 1915 had passed. Nevertheless there 
were young enough in a few fields to have warranted their destruction 
by means of the creosote line and post-hole traps, but when these 
fields were harvested, about July 1, they contained, owing to the wet-
ness of the season, so heavy a growth of wild grasses available as food 
for the chinch-bugs that there was no movement of the insects out of 
the stubble. 
Eggs of the second generation were fairly numerous in corn fi-elds 
by the second week in August, and young were appearing in moder-
ate numbers by the middle of that month; but many were killed by 
the heavy rains which fell over the whole of the infested area August 
20 and 21. Over eight inches of rain fell at a number of places in 
the southwestern part of the state during these two days. These heav-
iest rains of the season had much less effect than those of May and 
June, since most of the bugs were at this time in the corn where they 
were protected from the driving force of the storms. From August 
20 to about September 7 eggs and young could be found in moderate 
numbers in sca1 tered fields in all the more heavily infested territory, 
and most of thebe young reached maturity and went into winter quar-
ttrs. Examina1 ion of the usual hibernating places made during the 
winter of 1915-16 have convinced us, however, that chinch-bugs are 
not now present in sufficient numbers to cause any damage in 1916, 
unless conditions should be unusually favorable to their multiplication. 
While the r~.; ceptional spring and summer rains were thus the prin-
cipal causes of the arrest of this destructive insect invasion, certain 
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slower and less effective agencies had been for some time at work in 
the same direction, one of them at a rapidly increasing rate. There 
was no notable development of fungous disease such as has sometimes 
been useful in hastening the disappearance of an unusually injurious 
outbreak, but there was a considerable number of predaceous insects 
which found in the chinch-bug hord~ an acceptable and convenient 
food supply; and a minute insect parasite of the eggs of the chinch-
bug had appeared in the fields and begun to multiply much more rap-
idly than the chinch-bugs themselves-at a rate, indeed, to check se-
verely or perhaps to suppress entirely the uprising within a year or 
two longer. 
Effect of Predaceous Insects.-My field assistant, Mr. W. P. Flint, 
reports a list of some twenty species of predaceous insects-mostly 
lady-beetles, ground beetles, bugs (Hemiptera), and larvae of lace-
wing flies-which were eating chinch-bugs in the fields searched by 
him. By carefully collecting and counting chineh-bugs and their in-
sect enemies in twenty-six separately measured square yards of wheat 
stubble in different parts of central Illinois, he found that the num-
ber of these predaceous insects to that of the chinch-bugs in these 
fields in July, was about as 1 to 17; and by insectary experiments in 
feeding the various species of these insect enemies with living chinch-
bugs, he further found that the predaceous insects occurring on an 
average square yard of stubble would eat 11 chinch-bugs a day if 
confined to them for food. This is equivalent to about a million a day 
in a 20-acre field-a number much too small to have any marked ef-
fect upon a serious infestation. _ 
In addition to the foregoing I have an interesting note of an ob-
servation made June 16, 1914, by Mr. P. A. Glenn, of my office staff. 
\Vhile observing chinch-bugs in a Sangamon county corn-field he no-
ticed that ants (Formica fusca subsericea) which had their burrows 
in corn hills were attacking and killing many of the chinch-bugs that 
came near the corn, the ground around the hill being thickly strewn 
with the dead bodies of the bugs. The hill of corn which the ants were 
defending was in a healthy condition and comparatively free from 
the bugs, while the hills around it were covered with chinch-bugs, 
many of them killed. Numerous other hills of corn in the part of the 
field overrun with chinch-bugs were being similarly defended by the 
ants. 
1\fr. Flint also reports a similar habit of the common corn-field ant 
( Lasitts niger america nus). When spraying corn with Black Leaf 40, 
he twice saw this ant capture and drag away stupefied chinch-bugs; 
and he found the remains of 27 adult chinch-bugs in one of its nests. 
Effect of the Egg Parasite.-An egg parasite of the chinch-bug 
(Eumicrosoma benefica Gahan) discovered by McColloch in Ka11881 
in 1913• was first found in Illinois January 14, 1914, hibernating 
*Canadian Entomol~gist, Vol. 45, _p. 342. 
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among corn-field grasses in Macoupin county, and again in a similar 
situation March 3, near Marissa, in St. Clair county. Other speci-
'mens were obtained June 24 by keeping in closed dishes chinch-bugs' 
eggs collected May 5 at Plainview'- in Macoupin county, and again 
August 6 from eggs collected June 10. The extent of parasitism thus 
disclosed was, however, very small. From 11,521 eggs ·obtained be-
tween May 7 and September 9 at various points in twenty-four coun-
ties, and kept under normal conditions, parasites emerged from only 
140, 9 others dying, however, in parasitized eggs without completing 
their transformations. In other words, only about 1.5 percent of all 
the eggs collected during this period were found parasitized. Never-
theless, at some of the points where the presence of the parasites was 
demonstrated in the fields, from a fourth. to a third of the eggs were 
parasitized, and the general average of parasites at nine such points 
in six counties was 4.2 percent (149 parasites to 3524 eggs). In Kan-
sas during this same year the percentage of egg parasites at Man-
_hattan varied from .016 of 1 percent in May to 9 percent in August, 
and 25 percent in September, the last ratio being based, however, on 
a very small number of eggs collected. The ratio for the 11,000 eggs 
obtained at that place during the season was 15 percent parasitized, 
instead of the 1.5 percent in Illinois. In sixteen Kansas localities from 
which eggs were gathered in July and August, 1914, the percentage of 
parasitism was 14.5, while in Illinois the ratio for 1356 eggs coll'ecteq. 
in the same months in twenty-two localities was 10.6 percent. 
The chinch-bug egg parasite had evidently made· an excellent start 
in Illinois in 1914, materially helped on by our importation of para-
sitized eggs from Kansas, when the weather, intervened to destroy in 
great measure both the chinch-bugs and the parasites of their eggs. 
The following year ( 1915), parasitized eggs of chinch-bugs were found 
in fifteen Illinois counties instead of the six of the year preceding, 
but only 1.3 percent of the eggs collected in April, May, and June at 
these places were parasitized (128 parasites to 9972 eggs). It seems 
probable that the minute and delicate-winged parasites were even 
more susceptible to injury and destruction by the stormy, drenching 
weather of the season than were the chinch-bugs themselves. 
ARTIFICIAL MEASURES OF CONTROL 
It is evident from the foregoing that the "natural enemies" of the 
chinch-bug did it no serious harm in Illinois during the six years of its 
destructive prevalence here, and it remains to see what was attempted, 
what was done, what might have been done, and what may be done 
hereafter in any similar case arising, by man, the arch-enemy of all 
the injurious insect species. Other so-called ''enemies'' of the chinch-
bug are really its friends, in the sense that they find it useful to them 
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and avail themselves of its useful qualities. It is to their advantage, 
indeed, that it should increase at the highest rate and prevail in the 
largest numbers possible; while man alone would destroy it utterly as 
never useful to him and always injurious whenever it becomes abun-
clant. To this end four things arc necessary: a knowledge of the 
habits, haunts, and life history of the chinch-bug such as will enable us 
to see when, where, and how it can be attacked niost effectively; a 
knowledge of the best methods and materials for the operation against 
it; prompt and determined action at the critical time by the individual 
farmer whose interests are threatened; and cooperative arrangements 
and agreements which shall bring to bear upon the undertaking the 
joint effort of all in the common interest. 
It is well and widely known that there are two periods in the year 
when the chinch-bug may ·be successfully attacked, under favorable 
conditions. · These are the winter season, when it is in hibernation 
among dead grasses and under the shelter of leaves and other rubbish 
on the ground; and the time of wheat harvest, when it must escape 
from the deadened wheat fields on foot to find fresh food in other 
crops. 
BURNING OUT IN "\VINTER 
In the dry climate of the " 'vestern plains" the dead bunch-grasses 
and other winter harborage of the chinch-bug can commonly be burned 
in winter close enough to the ground to destroy the greater part of 
the insects in their winter quarters; and marked success has been had 
with this method, espe<:.jally in Kansas, where it has lately become a 
principal reliance in chinch-bug campaigns. Occasionally in Illinois 
the weather is dry enough to make this method feasible; and in the 
hope that the winter of 1911-12 might prove to be one of this character, 
I issued in November, 1911, a circular of information, warning, and 
advice with a view to a general clearing up and burning over of the 
winter shelters of the chinch-bug in a way and at a time to destroy 
the insects themselves. Considerable preparations were made to this 
end by farmers in several localities; but the character of the winter 
weather was such that very little could be done; and the same was true 
of the three later winters during which the chinch-bug was present in 
extraordinary. numbers. The dead grass and the rubbish on the 
ground were but rarely dry enough to burn to the deeper layers where 
the chinch-bugs were wintering; and then only locally and for a very 
short time. Furthermore, in the climate of central and southern 
Illinois the stems of the more abundant kind of bunch-grass (Andro-
pogon virginicton), the favorite wintering place of the chinch-bug, 
remain green at their bases for an inch or two above the ground, and 
hence can rarely be burned far enough down to destroy the insect.s 
nestled away among them. (Figs. 1, 2, 3.) ' 
The burning method was however tested practically by my field 
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assistants, Flint and Smith, near Coulterville, in Randolph county, 
at several times between December 19, 1911, and March 20, 1912. By 
selecting the most favorable times and places more than half of the 
bugs were disposed of, as was ascertained by carefully collecting and 
eounting all the chinch-bugs in several bunches of grass, or on meas-
ured surfaces of other shelter, both before and after the field was 
burned over. One of the most definite tests of this description was 
made March 19 and 20, 1912, by counting the bugs in twenty stools 
of bunch-grass-ten before and ten after the field was burned. In this 
field the t en unburned bunches contained 5198 living and 335 dead 
chinch-bugs, and the ten burned bunches contained 2767 living bugs 
and 767 dead. If we may assume that the number of living insects 
was practically the same in these two lots of bunch~s before the burn-
ing, then 47 percent of the chinch-bugs (2431) were destroyed in the 
lot burned over, 432 of these being merely killed and the remainder 
burned up. In the whole series of this year's experiments with bunch-
grass, the chinch-bugs in 46 unburned and 40 burned stools of these 
plants were counted in all, with the result that the unburned stools 
averaged 554 and the burned stools 280 living chinch-bugs each. 
According to these data about half the bugs had been killed by burn-
ing the grass. 
Furthermore,according to counts made of measured areas, each a 
foot in diameter, covered with leaves, weeds, and other similar rub-
bish, (Fig. 4) twenty-five such patches yielded, unburned, 12,456 
chinch-bugs ( 498 to the patch), and eight others yielded 121 chinch-
bugs each after they had been burned off. This would indicate the 
destruction of 76 percent of the bugs under such shelter by the opera-
tion. In brief, from 50 to 75 percent of the chinch-bugs contained in 
these winter shelters seem to have been destroyed by our experimental 
burnings under these peculiarly favorable conditions-sufficient evi-
dence of the utility of this method when such conditions are general 
and continuous rather than local and temporary. Southern Illinois 
lends itself, however, rather poorly to the burning-out method, an 
abundance of shelter for hibernating insects being afforded in thick-
ets, woodland borders, hedges, and other miscellaneous places of winter 
resort which it would be quite impossible to burn over at all gener-
ally. Nevertheless, both our own experience and the successful work 
of others show the very great value of this method whenever and 
wherever conditions· favor its use. It is the least expensive of all 
:Operations against the chinch-bug, and should be undertaken when-
ever possible by cooperative, neighborhood measures, both in one's 
own interest and in that of the community at large. 
DESTRUCTION OF CHINCH-BUGS AT THE vVHEAT H ARVEST 
, ThE;l best means known in 1909 for preventing tlie escape of chinch-
ugs from an infested field of wheat at harvest-time was to pour a 
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narrow line of coal-tar along an especially prepared path at the edge 
of the field, with post-holes dug at intervals beside the line to trap and 
hold the bugs. This method, tho long in use, has certain serious handi-
caps, owing especially to the nature of the material used in making the 
impassable line; and I undertook to find some substance better suited 
to the purpose. Coal-tar answers admirably when first poured out, 
its adhesiveness and offensiveness preventing the passage of the bugs, 
which ordinarily do not even attempt to cross the line, and are imme-
diately destroyed if they touch it. It is, however, so fluid at tempera-
tures high enough to stimulate the chinch-bugs to escape from barren 
stubble fields that it sinks too quickly into the ground and must be 
cften renewed at a large cost of labor and material. Even before it 
has thus disappea~ed, exposure to the ai:r causes a film to form upon 
its surface so that it may be crossed by the bugs readily and without 
injury. lV[oreover, as it is a by-product of gas manufacture, its supply 
is limited and can not be increased to meet an increasing demand; and 
its price, already high for the purpose, is certain to rise when the de-
mand becomes unusual. 
EXPERIMENTS WITH CoAL-TAR MixTURES AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
Beginning in late August, 1910, an elaborate series of tests were 
made at Urbana of mixtures of coal-tar with various denser or pow-
dered substances such as might give it greater body and so prevent its 
sinking too rapidly into the hot earth. Other experiments were made 
by mixing with it less volatile oils, resins, etc., which, uniting with 
- coal-tar, in solution, might make the mixture more lasting when ex-
posed to the heat. These various substances were tested in an electric 
oven the .heat of which could be controlled, and in the open air out-of-
doors. One. hundred and thirty-five experiments of this character 
were run thru in the month of September with the result that a few of 
the substances tested seemed worthy of trial in the air under condi-
tions as nearly like those of an Illinois summer as could be found at 
that late season. For this purpose Mr. Flint was sent tt> Brownsville, 
Texas, at the mouth of the Rio Grande River, with instructions to imi-
tate on a small scale our standard field operations against the chinch-
hug at harvest-time. The temperature, even thus far south, was, how-
ever, at the time of his visit (November 19 to December 3), too low to 
afford a fair test. The minimum readings in the open air ranged from 
43 to 72 degrees-in the shade and the maximum from 68 to 86 degrees, 
with a maximum temperature of 109 degrees F., at the surface of the 
soil in the sun. The substances whose efficiency was compared with 
respect to the time during which they would continue sticky enough 
to keep chinch-bugs from crossing them were coal-tar, 18-gravity oil, 
Heppe's flux oil, asphalt oil, and Superior oils Nos. 1 and 2. Of these, 
Heppe's flux oil, a petroleum product, proved to be from five to 
seven times as lasting as coal tar. As an average of eleven identical 
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tests, with temperatures ranging during each trial from 40 to 109 de-
grees, a narrow line of this oil poured upon the leveled earth of a back-
furrow remained sufficiently sticky, without renewal, for twenty-one 
hours·; and poured on inverted sod it continued effective in tempera-
tures ranging _from 40 to 103 degrees for thirty-eight and a half hours, 
as an average of six tests. On the other hand, nineteen tests with coal-
tar applied to a back furrow gave an average of four hours and ten 
minutes with temperatures ranging from 40 to 100 degrees; and seven 
experiments with its application to sod gave an average duration of . 
five hours. 
The Petroleum Road Oils.-My attention being thus called to the 
possibility that petroleum residues might be found a more efficient and 
dependable means of defense than coal-tar, I began a correspondence 
with the vice-president of the Standard Oil Company, in Chicago, and 
the chief chemist of the refinery of that company, at Whiting, Ind., 
as a result of which they kindly had prepared for me samples of 
petroleum products similiar to road-oils, one of which seemed, on test-
ing, to have the precise qualities sought for. · 
Four of the most promising of these substances were carefully 
tested in comparison with coal-tar at Urbana in April, 1911, by. pour-
ing them on very dry black · soil in the insectary o~ my entomological 
.office, recording temperatures, and noting the effects on the lines laid 
down. These were the Standard Oil Company's road oil No. 5 (con-
taining 50 percent of asphaltic materials), their road oiL No. 6 (con-
taining 60 percent of asphaltic materials), and their 14-gravity and 
16-gravity residuum oils. By experiments commenced at 2 :30 p. m :- · 
April19 and continued until 8 a. m. of April 22, it was found neces-
sary to pour road oil No. 6 three times where nine pourings were nec-
essary with No. 5, and 7 pourings with the 16-gravity .oil. The tem-
peratures of these days, as shown by · thermometers placed on the soil 
in the sun, ranged from 68 degrees F. April 19 to 100 degrees April 
21, and the exceptional reading of 125 degrees at 1 p.m. of April 20. 
Another series, carried thru nearly two days, from 11 a. m. of 
April 25 to 7 a. m. of 1\priT 27, brought into com_ .~ arison this No. 6 
road oil, ordinary coal-tar, and 14-gravity oil. ,, here coal-tar re-
quired pouring thirteen times, once was sufficient with No. 6 road oil, 
and three times was necessary with 14-gravity oil. The results of 
these experiments led us to use road oil No. 6 in all our extensive 
operations in 1911. The summer of 1911 proved, however, to be ex-
cessively hot and dry, Sparta, for example, showing mean tempera-
tures for May five degrees above normal, for June four and a half de-
grees, and for July one and three tenths degrees, with a maximum of 
105 degrees in the shade for July 4; while the rainfall fell below nor-
mal, 2.44 inches in May, 2.58 inches in June, and 1.78 inches in July. 
On the extremely hot and very dry earth in the open sun the No.6 road 
oil, altho preferable to coal-tar, became too fluid to serve the best pur-
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pose; and experiments were begun in the fall of that year with a pro-
duct of the same class containing 70 percent of asphalt materials, and 
known as "Road Oil No. 7." To secure an effective test of this oil in 
time for its use the following season, Mr. Flint was sent to Yuma, 
Arizona, where he made, October 9 to 15, a series of experiments sim-
ilar to those of the preceding year, but under conditions much more 
favorable to a fair trial of the materials in hand. Only .12 of an inch 
of rain had fallen at Yuma for two and a half months, and the maxi-
. mum daily temperatures at the time of his visit ranged from 80 to 96 
degrees in the shade and the daily minimum from 41 to 66 degrees. 
The earth in the sun where the experiments were made warmed up 
to surface temperatures ranging from 100 to 120 degrees for several 
hours during the middle of each day. 
To maintain an effective barrier for 6 days on a fairly level sur-
face of very dry, sandy loam it was found necessary, under these con-
ditions, to pour a line of coal-tar fourteen times, equal to two or three 
times a day; while road Oil No.7 was poured but three times and road 
Oil No. 8 but once. The road oil last mentioned, containing 80 percent 
of asphaltic materials, had the disadvantage that it must be heated to 
run fr.om the vessel used in pouring, and that it was not soft enough 
to hold the chinch-bugs at the lowest temperatures at which movements 
of escape might begin. On a surface with a slope of forty-five degrees, 
an effective barrier was kept up 4 days with road oil No. 7 by pouring 
jt seven times, while it took thirteen applications of coal-tar to main-
tain an effective line under these conditions for two days only. 
Several other experiments had indeed been made in September, 
1911, by L. M. Smith, at Coulterville, Ill., bringing into comparison 
road oils Nos. 6 and 7 with coal-tar on the one hand, and with other 
products of the Standard Oil Company and the Barrett ~Ianufactur­
ing Co., of Ghicago. To make these tests the stubble was scraped from 
the earth in a wheat field in a way to leave a hard smooth, but some-
what irregular surface, upon which the tars and oils were poured in 
a narrow line, such as one would use in making a barrier around a 
fields of infested wheat. These lines were all kept up for ten days, be-
ginning September 5. The daytime temperatures varied from 78 de-
grees to 104 degrees F. by a thermometer placed upon the bare ground 
in the sun. Several rains fell during the period, some of them heavy 
enough to interrupt the experiment by covering the lines with dirt or 
by washing them away. Nevertheless, the results were significant an~ 
conclusive. 
To· maintain perfect lines it was found necessary to pour ordinary 
'coal-tar forty-one timeS' during the ten days, road oil No. 6 ten times, 
and road oil No. 7 but four, and these only because of the rains. Still 
heavier road-oils with 80 percent and 90 percent of asphaltic materials 
re~pectively (Nos. 8 and 9), required heating to make them fluid 
enough for pouring, No. 8 to 130 degrees and No. 9 to 160 degrees. 
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'When so applied, No. 8 was somewhat more persistent than No. 7; 
but No. 9 became hard enough at 80 degrees to bear the weight of a 
chinch-bug, and it w'as not in perfect condition as a barrier until the 
Bt)il temperature reached a bout 100 degrees. Most of the other mixtures 
tried were too fluid for the purpose, requiring from ten to forty-three 
applications in the ten days. They were also liable to form a film on 
the surface, enabling insects to cross even when the substance was still 
soft beneath. 
As a result of these experiments, road oil No. 7 was the material 
mainly used in all our operations against the chinch-bug in 1912. 
(Figs. 5, 6, 7.) Especially recommended in a circular issued May 3, 
and used in our own field demonstrations, it was brought into the in-
fested region in barrels by freight from Whiting in car-load lots and 
everywhere accomplished the purpose intended. It had, however, two 
rather serious disadvantages . . It required for its successful use the 
careful preparation of a hard smooth path upon which the oil could be 
poured, and it was desirable that this pathway should be raised above 
the general surface to protect it as far as rossible fro·m d.ust and other 
objects likely to be blown upon it in a way to facilitate its passage by 
the chinch-bugs. In extremely hot, dry weather the task of preparing 
such a path i'n the hard dry earth was in some soils very difficult, and 
in some almost impracticable. 
A more serious obstacle to success lay, however, in the fact that 
road oil of the quality needed in the chinch-bug work was not wanted 
or made for any other purpose, and that it must consequently be or-
dered some time in advance. Often the farmer would suddenly dis-
cover that his corn crop was endangered, was being already invaded, 
perhaps, from a neighboring field of wheat, only to find that he must 
wait a fortnight or more for relief; and by that tiiLe the. mischief 
would be done. Furthermore, as the place of manufacture was dis-
tant a hundred and fifty to two hundred miles from the infested terri-
tory, delays in transportation were frequently serious, large ship-
ments, alt-ho called for in time, sometimes arriving after the emer-
gency for which they had been ordered had mainly passed. 
Failure of the 1913 Road OiZ.-There was an oil refinery of large 
capacity at Wood River, in Madison county, within the infested terri-
tory, and it seemed possible to avoid the worst of the difficulties just 
mentioned by transferring the manufacture of road oil No. 7 from 
Whiting to that place; and in the spring of 1913 arrangements were 
made to this end. This step proved, however, most unfortunate, for 
reasons which we could not possibly have foreseen. The road oil fur- . 
nished from the Wood River refinery, altho made by the same pro-
cess and containing the same percentage of asphalt as that from Whit-
ing, proved on delivery to have very different physical qualities, and 
to be inferior eyen to coal-tar for use against the chinch-bug. Where 
the Whiting oil would lie on a properly prepared surface as a viscid 
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ridge for two, three, or even four days, the Wood River oil would 
sink into the ground ~lmost at once. 
Later explanations from the responsible chemists brought out th~ 
fact that the two refineries were supplied with crude oil from different 
oil:..fields, that furnished the Whiting refinery making a thick and 
viscid road oil and the other a comparatively fluid and penetrating 
one. Owing to this difference, indeed, the Wood River oil is much 
used for road-making, for which the oil must penetrate and consoli-
date, as it dries, the surface layers of earth on the road; while the 
\Vhiting product, lacking this quality of penetration, is virtually use-
less as a road oil. These facts were known, of course, to the Standard 
Oil officials, but their bearing on our work was not appreciated; and 
they were unknown to us until the almost total failure of field opera-
tions called for an explanation. The Oil Company furnishing this oil 
readily returned to purchasers all sums received for it, but this of 
course did not compensate for the losses due to dependence on it as a 
protection against the chinch-bug. 
Crude Cr;eosote as a Repellent.-By a lucky accident another sub-
stance had been found in 1912 nearly as effective against the chinch-
bug as road oils of the best grade, costing more but requiring less 
labor to prepare a path, and obtainable at any time and in any quan-
tity. A Montgomery county farmer, Mr. Henry Niehaus, who had ex-
hausted his supply of coal-tar in trying to protect his corn against 
chinch-bugs coming from his wheat at harvest-time, was unable to 
get more at Litchfield, but was given for trial some oil of creosote 
from a barrel on hand in the general store of Bartling and Hussey, 
with the remark that it was the ''worst-smelling stuff they had ever 
handled" and that "it ought to stop chinch-bugs, or anything else." 
Poured along the coal-tar lines, it proved as effective as the coal-tar, 
and was used for the rest of the season by Mr. Niehaus and by five of 
his neighbors also. The facts coming to the knowledge of Mr~ Flint 
(my field assistant for that part of the state) in May, 1913, experi-
ments were at once made which showed that the chinch-bugs were 
strongly held in check by the odorous vapors given off by the ere~ 
sote, and not by any caustic or other physical property. Indeed bugs 
surrounded by a circular belt of creosote on the ground would cross 
it quickly when excited and without the slightest injury; but if it 
were placed as a line across their path they would stop short of its 
margin and turn in another direction. Enough was done with this 
substance during the latter part .of the season of 1913 to warrant us 
in giving it equal standing with the petroleum road-oils-preferable 
indeed in some respects~and this was the material with which the 
final, most extensive, and most successful campaign-of our chinch-bug 
period was mainly made in 1914. 
The fluid creosote did not lie upon the surface but sank readily into 
the ground, slowly evaporating on exposure, and it was necessary to 
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renew it only when the odor became too faint to repel the bugs. On 
this account it was only necessary to prepare a fairly level strip on 
which it might be poured, careful smoothing. and firming of the path 
being unessential. 
That it is the odorous vapor of creosote which prevents the pas-
sage of the bugs is illustrated not only by our field observations of the 
reluctance of the insects to approach the creosote strip, but also by an 
experiment made by Mr. Flint at Springfield in December, 1913. 
Fifty adult chinch-bugs were confined in an open box, 19x9 inches and 
llj2 inches deep, by chalking the upper edges of the sides. After they 
had settled quietly, various strong-smelling substances were introduced 
among them. Tested in this way the chinch-bugs paid no attention to 
sulphur or asafetida, and but little to wood soaked with chlorhydric 
acid, but they immediately scatter.ed when exposed to the vapors of 
creosote, none of them coming within two inches of the object for 
the next four hours during which they were watched, and still keep-
ing at a distance of an inch from it five hours later. Formic acid 
was almost equally repellant. 
Altho a creosote line was not so complete a. protection as one of road 
oil, a ·small percentage of the chinch-bugs filtering past it even when 
it was properly laid and carefully supervised, yet the number was 
never large enough to do noticeable harm to corn; while in one respect 
the creosote barrier was better than the road oils since its odor was 
not affected by dust, straws, or other rubbish blown across it, such as 
would often cover or bridge a road oil line in a way to· allow the bugs 
to pass it readily. The efficiency of an old creosote barrier might even 
be increased by a shower of rain sufficient to destroy that of a road-
oil line by washing parts of it away or covering them with dirt. The 
creosote, being lighter than water, rose to the surface when the ground 
was wet, and its efficiency was thus increased, rather than lessened, 
by the rain. 
The average cost of the creosote used to keep up an effective bar-
rier during the chinch-bug migration season of 1914 was $16.50 for 
each mile of the line. We have definite information of the use of 
1840 barrels this year, at a usual cost of $7 to $10 a barrel according 
to quantity and quality ordered. 
EXPERIMENTS WITH INSECTICIDE SPRAYS 
Kerosene Emulsion.-As a secondary method of defense against 
chinch-bugs, very useful under certain conditions and in certain 
emergencies, spraying with insecticides which kill by contact is es-
pecially to be advised. That a 5-percent kerosene emulsion will kill the 
chinch-bugs at a reasonable expense was a fact first established by the 
writer in 1882; but this material has the disadvantage that its correct 
preparation requires special care and considerable labor, and that if 
used on young corn it mu~t be so applied as not to lodge in the "heart" 
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or curl of leaves at the tip of the plant, since otherwise it will kill the 
corn. By field experiments made with it in August, 1911, from 60 
to 86 percent of the bugs were killed with a 4-percent solution on corn 
about two feet high. It -vvas applied with a portable "automatic" 
pump which forced the fluid out by air-pressure in a small solid 
stream and not in a spray. The emulsion w2.s made by dissolving 
eight ounces of soap, by boiling, in a gallon of water, adding two gal-
lons of kerosene to the hot solution and pumping the mixture back 
into itself in a forcible stream for several minutes, until it made a 
uniform, cream-like mixture from which the oil would not separate on 
standing. This gallon of ''stock emulsion'' was diluted by adding to 
it fifteen and a half gallons of water to make a mixture containing 
4 percent of kerosene. 
Easier methods of preparing the kerose~e-soap emulsion and sim-
pler methods of applying it to the corn were found unsatisfactory, 
sometimes because comparatively few of the bugs were killed, some-
times because the corn was injured, and sometimes for both of these 
reasons together. 
Tobacco Preparations.-In 1910, experiments made in southern 
Illinois by Mr. L. M. Smith, in charge of our chinch-bug work in that 
part of the state that year, showed that a spray of tobacco extract 
known as ''Black Leaf 40'' was much more easily prepared than the 
kerosene emulsion, was more deadly to the chinch-bugs, and was not at 
all injurious to the plants to which it was applied. Precise tests of 
this insecticide were made by Mr. Flint at Plainview in August, 1911. 
In the first of these a half ounce of the tobacco extract was diluted 
w1th a gallon of water in which half an ounce of soap had been dis-
solved, and the solution was applied in a small straight stream, by 
means of a portable automatic pump, to infested corn from twenty 
to forty inches high. Twenty-four hours later twenty hills of this 
corn taken at random were carefully examined, with the result that 
on three of the hills 75 percent of the bugs were dead, and on seven-
teen hills.90 percent, making an average of 88.5 percent for the whole, 
while the corn was not injured in the least. In four similar experi-
ments the Black Leaf 40 was reduced to a fourth of an ·ounce to 
the gallon of water, and the soap was increased to one and a half 
ounces. In these the percentages of bugs killed ranged from 74 to 
85.5 and in still another experiment, with half an ounce of Black 
Leaf 40 and half an ounce of .soap, the number of chinch-bugs killed 
on the different hills was estimated at 75 to 90 percent. 
The cost of the materials necessary for a thoro treatment of in-
fested corn varies of course with the size of the plants. In corn six 
feet high it averaged $5 per acre; in that six to fourteen inches high 
it averaged $1.30 per acre. With the small portable spraying appara-
tus used in the_se experiments it would have taken one man eighteen 
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hours to spray an acre of corn six feet high, or four and a half hours 
per acre of corn averaging ten inches high. 
The profitable use of these tobacco sprays is practically limited to 
fields of large corn the outer rows of which have become heavily in-
fested by chinch-bugs, which thru neglect or accident, have en-
tered the corn from adjoining fields of wheat in numbers sufficient if 
left to themselves to destroy the entire field; and to fields of young 
corn which have become infested by chinch-bugs of the hibernating 
generation in early spring. Many instances of this latter kind occurred 
in 1912 where farmers plowed up in spring heavily infested wheat 
because of winter-killing or injury by the Hessian fly, planting corn 
at once on the same ground. The chinch-bugs already in the field 
infested the corn as soon as it came up, and laid their eggs there for 
the first new generation of the year; and these presently appeared in 
numbers to destroy the corn completely when it was only a few inches 
high. A general spraying of this young corn with Black Leaf 40, 1;4 
ounce to the gallon, saved the crop in many fields at a comparatively 
trifling expense. 
Other corn-fields became infested in the same way by reason of a 
cool spring which produced a heavy growth of wild grasses in the 
old corn-fields before they were plowed. The chinch-bugs laid their 
eggs on these grasses in immense numbers, and when the fields were 
plowed and planted to corn the young bugs destroyed the corn plants 
except where effective spraying was done. 
Insecticide Sprays in Wheat Fields.-In the latter half of April, 
1912, a number of field experiments were made with sprays applied to 
chinch-bugs in wheat fields with a view to learning whether it inight 
be feasible and profitable to destroy the bugs at that season of the year 
after they had gone into the wheat, particularly where, as is often the 
case, certain patches of the wheat were much more heavily infested 
than the remainder. To secure precise results chinch-bugs were taken 
from their winter shelter, usually bunch-grass, and placed in plots of 
wheat a yard square surrounded by a road-oil line to prevent the 
escape of the insects. The wheat was three or four inches high at the 
time. 
In each of three such experiments, twenty bugs, taken from the 
plot after it had been thoroly sprayed, were placed in a cardboard 
box, and left there for twenty-four hours. In one where a sixth of an 
ounce of Black Leaf 40 was used to the gallon of water, eight of the 
twenty in the box were dead after twenty-four hours, and six others 
were so affected that they were not able to crawl. They doubtles~ died 
later from the effects of the treatment. In still another experiment, 
where one fourth of an ounce of the tobacco extract was used, all of 
the twenty bugs were dead after twenty-four hours except two which 
could still make slight movements of the legs; and in a third experi-
ment of the same character, three of the twenty were able to crawl and 
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three others made slight movements of the legs, the remainder being 
dead. In all these plots there were many dead bugs on the ground 
where the wheat had been sprayed. The same was true _of other ex-
periments made in the same way, in which none of the bugs were sep-
arated for counting. 
In another lot of fifteen experiments with Black Leaf 40, chinch-
bugs collected in hibernation were placed on dry cloths in lots of 
twenty, sprayed with tobacco solution, and transferred at once to dry 
cardboard boxes. Examined from twenty-four to forty-eight hours 
afterwards 71 percent of the bugs so handled were found to be dead. 
Additional experiments of the same general description, made 
with ~erosene emulsion containing 5 and 10 percent of kerosene, ap-
plied to . chinch-bugs in the wheat, showed that this insecticide ·was 
practically without effect under these conditions. In three such ex-
periments only three bugs were killed. That this was due in part to 
the conditions in the field is shown by the different result of tests made 
by spraying kerosene emulsion upon chinch-bugs placed on a dry cloth 
and transferring them to cardboard boxes. In this case 54 percent of 
the bugs were killed as an average of eight experiments. Similar 
trials were made of scalecide at various strengths, from 1 percent to 
10 percent in water, with practically no effect on the bugs. Emulsions 
of gasoline and soap containing 5 and 10 percent of gasoline proved 
similarly useless, as did also solutions of iron sulphate in proportions 
of one pound and two pounds to the gallon of water. 
As the tobacco extracts prepared by manufacturing companies are 
rather expensive, it was thought possible that cheaper and equally 
effective sprays might be made direct from the wastes of tobacco fac-
tories, and a few tests of this supposition were also made in 1911. 
In the best of these three ounces of cigar clippings were boiled in a 
gallon of water for half an hour and diluted with twice as much water 
in which an ounce of soap to the gallon had been dissolved by boiling. 
This mixture was applied to infested cern with a portable automatic 
sprayer which discharged a small straight stream. The result as 
tested by a careful examination of the sprayed hills of corn twenty-
four hours later showed that from 21 to 48 percent of the bugs had 
been killed. 
Experiments with Solutions of Soap.-In all these mixtures thus 
far described, whether made with kerosene or tobacco, small amounts 
of soap were used either to produce an emulsion or to increase the 
spreading and penetrating power of the tobacco solution. To distin-
guish the insecticide properties of these ingredients experiments were 
made with soap solutions alone, with results so unexpectedly favorable 
that an elaborate series of tests were made at Springfield during the 
winter of 1912-13 with a lai!ge number of different brands of soap ob-
tainable on the ordinary market. In each of these experiments a 
number of chinch-bugs collected from their hibernating quarters and 
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brought into the laboratory were placed on dry paper, thoroly sprayed, 
and transferred at once to dry paper bags in which they were left for 
twenty-four hours at a temperature of about 65 degrees F. From the 
following table it will be seen that the different brands of soap differed 
quite remarkably in their apparent insecticide power, the home-made 
~ lye soap as tested in seven experiments (88.6 percent killed) equaling 
the solutions of Black Leaf 40, while Peosta soap, as tested in ten ex-
periments, killed about as many chinch-bugs as the best of our home-
made infusions of cigar clippings. The lowest ratio of chinch-bugs 
killed was 40.8 percent as the average of eleven experiments with 
Lenox soap. 
For large-scale operations the commercial ext:r:.acts of tobacco, used 
as already described, are undoubtedly to be preferred as the .most ef-
fective and reliable; but for emergency work soap solutions will serve 
an excellent purpose. One hundred and sixty-seven experiments made 
with fourteen brands of soap gave an average of 66 percent of the in-
sects killed by this means. 
INSECTICIDE T ESTS OF SOAP SOLUTIONS MADE BY W. P. FLINT, AT SPRINGFIELD, 
DURING THE WINTER OF 1912- '13 
Brands of soap I 
Home-made lye ....... . 
Grandpa 's Tar .... . ... . 
Rub-no-more ........... . 
Swift's Borax ........ . 
Pyles Pearline ....... . 
Brown's Pine Tar .... . 
Home-made Rosin ..... . 
German mottled ...... . 
Topsy Tar ........... . 
Fels Naphtha ......... . 
Ivory ................ . 
American Family . . .. . . 
Peosta ............... . 
Lenox ............... . 
No. of 
experiments 
7 
11 
11 
8 
17 
8 
15 
9 
17 
4 
15 
24 
10 
11 
I No. of / Percentage of chinch-bugs used chinch-bugs killed 
70 88.6 
110 77.3 
110 73.6 
143 73.4 
230 73.0 
109 70.6 
157 70.0 
100 67.0 
132 64.3 
62 61.0 
190 59.2 
250 56.4 
100 48.0 
120 40.8 
----------------- ---------- 1--------------1---------~--
Av., 66.0 167 1,883 
As a test of the pl'actical usefulness of the soap sprays applied to 
entire fields of ·well-grown corn, an acre and a half of heavily infested 
corn was treated at Plainview August 2, 1913, when the plants were 
four to six feet high. Unfortunately the soap selected was one of the 
brands which experiments had shown to be of rather low efficiency. 
Twelve bars of American Family Soap, each weighing ten ounces, 
were _dissolved in forty gallons of hard water (3 ounces to the gallon), 
and the solution was applied to the corn by means of a barrel pump 
set on a drag and drawn by one horse between the rows. Two rows of 
corn were sprayed at each round of the field, one man driving the 
horse and working the pump, and another handling the Bor:.deaux noz-
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zle. The thoro treatment of this acre and a half of corn required three 
hundred and twenty gallons of spray, costing thirty cents an acre for 
the soap and the labor of two men and a horse for a day and a half. 
An examination of the treated corn three days later showed that about 
75 percent of the hugs had been killed-apparently all that were ac-
tually reached by tho fluid. Those alive had evidently been protected 
by the boots of the leaves behind which they were hidden. The corn 
showed nowhere any tTace of injury. 
FIELD BXPERTMENTS AND DEMONSTRA'l'ION FIELDS 
Beginning in June, 1910, wheat fields heavily infested by chinch-
hugs and so situated as to be readily accessible to the farmers of the 
vicinity ·were secured for experiments, and practical demonstrations 
were made of the trap and barrier method, at first with coal-tar, later 
with the two road-oils Nos. (j and 7, and finally with crude creosote. 
D emonstrat1"ons u·ith Coal-tar in 1910.-A demonstration field near 
Oakdale, in \Vashington county, gives us a good illustration of the 
· value of this method, with coal-tar as the medium. This was a twenty-
acre field of wheat sufficiently infested by both Hessian fly and chinch-
bugs to make it doubtful whether the crop would repay the harvesting 
expenses. A barri er was made June 22, 1910, by plowing, smoothing, 
and compacting a ridge on all sides of this field, digging post-holes to 
a depth of eighteen inches at the edge of the ridge, at intervals of 
twenty-five, fifty, and a hundred feet on different sides of the field, 
and pouring a Darrow lir1e of coal-tar on the dry ground along the 
center of the ridge in a way to touch each post-hole on the side farthest 
from the field. This barrier, three quarters of a mile in length, was 
kept up for eleven days. after which time so few bugs were left in thf:. 
wheat as to make fur ther work unnecessary. The chinch-bugs accum-
ulating in the post-hole traps were killed with kerosene poured into thE: 
holes, followed by sufficient water to float the oil to the top of the mass. 
The coal-tar sank so readily into the dry and dusty earth on thE: 
first day that three applications were necessary, but two a day there-
after served the purpose, one made about seven in the morning and 
the other at 2:30 in the afternoon. These times were selected in order 
to oppose a line of fresh tar to the chinch-bug during both morning 
and afternoon movements. In the hot clear weather of these days the 
chinch-bugs moved from 7 to 10 in the morning, but from 10:30 to~ 
in the afternoon there were practically none in motion except in 
shaded places. 'J1he principal movement of the day, however, came, as 
a rule, between ~~ :30 and 5 :30 in the afternoon. 
Converting our data of cost of operation into expense per mile of 
barrier-a line sufficient, that is, to surround a 40-acre field-reckon-
ing the farm labor used at $2 a day and the coal tar at the market 
price of that season--$2.50 a barrel and freight from the nearest 
point-we 11ave a total cost of $23.41 per mile for the whole period of 
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eleven days, of which $13.33 was the value of the labor and $10.08 the 
cost of the tar used. This was at the rate of $2.13 per mile for each day 
of the time during which the barrier was lrept up, of which $1.21 per 
mile per day was the value of the labor and ninety-two cents the cost 
of the tar used. 
An attempt \vas made to measure the bugs caught in the post-
holes, and 3V2 bushels were actually collected; but heavy rains on July 
2, 3, and 4 filled the holes with mud and water, and made further 
measurement impracticable. On the sides of the field where the post-
hole traps were a hundred feet apart, many of the bugs attempting 
to escape failed to find them and were either killed by the hot dust of 
the barrier ridge or entangled in the coal-tar line and thus escaped 
our measurement. If we take the 3V2 bushels as the total yield of the 
operation, the cost was $5.02 per bushel of chinch-bugs, of which $2.16 
was for coal-tar and $2.86 for labor. · As there are about 8,500,000 
chinch-bugs to the bushel at this time of the year, this was at the rate 
of nearly 17,000 dead chinch-bugs for each cent of the expense. When 
we take into ac.count the fact that these were all bugs of the first gen-
eration of the year, and that if allowed to escape .they would presently 
have bred a second generation to infest the corn at a rate, according 
to previous observations and estimates, of about 100 to 1, it is easily 
seen that this was an immensely profitable operation to the community 
as a whole and immediately useful also to the farmer concerned, as 
saving his corn from destruction where it lay beside wheat. 
In a field near Patoka, in 1\lfarion county, a barrier seventy rods in 
length was maintained for twenty-seven days, June 28 to July 24, 
between a field of infested wheat and one of corn immediately adjoin-
ing. The difference in time during which the barrier was maintained 
in this field and in that at Oakdale was due to the quick destruction of 
the wheat in the Oakdale field by insect infestation which compelled 
a prompt escape of the bugs to obtain food. In this Patoka field it was 
necessary to renew the tar-line thirty-seven times and to use sixty-five 
gallons of coal-tar in so doing. '"fhe labor in this case amounted to 
$4.80 and the eost of the tar was $4.04,-a total expense per mile of 
barrier of $40.42, of which the labor item would be $21.95 and that for 
coal-tar, $18.47. This is equivalent to $1.49 per mile for each day 
during which the barrier was maintained; but of this sum only sixty-
eight cents per day was for the cost of materials. 
The third demonstration field of this season was near Dubois, in 
Washington <.:ounty, where a tar line a hundred and twenty-eight rods 
in length was maintained for nineteen days, June 21 to July 9. In 
this case tar was poured upon the barrier ridge thirty-eight times-an 
average of twice a day-at a cost of $15.77, of which $6.80 was for labor 
and $8,97 for tar. The latter sum was regarded by the field superin-
tendent as excessive, the tar having been wasted by too liberal use in 
pouring. 'l'his was a total expense fQr the season of $39.43 per mile 
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of barrier, of which $17 was for labor and $22.43 for tar. Or, other-
wise stated, the cost of the operation was $2.07 per mile per day, of 
which ninety cents per mile was for labor and $1.17 for tar. 
It is a fair general statement of the cost of the coal-tar barrier 
under the conditions· of 1910 to say that it was equivalent to $1.50 to 
$2 a mile per day, and that the cost of materials was approximately 
45 percent of the whole, the remainder being an allowance for the 
labor of horse and man. 
Demonstrations with Road O{l No . 6 in 1911.-The events of 1910 
having shown us that we were undoubtedly at the beginning of one of 
the periodital uprisings of the chinch-bugs, tremendously destructive 
to Illinoit: agriculture, preparations were made for a general cam-
paign of education, demonstration, and organized d.efense. Thoro 
scouting in winter and spring, by my field assistants having defined 
the area likely to be heavily infested, this was divided into five dis-
tricts, r.n assistant was assigned to each, and a superintendent of 
operations and supply was engaged to take general charge. Each of 
the assistants was provided with a motorcycle and the superintendent 
with an automobile roadster, to enable them to cover a large territory 
as rapidly as possible when the brief season of activity should arrive. 
As our road oil No. 6 was virtually unknown to the farmers, and as 
the source of supply was about two hundred and fifty miles from the 
place of demand, it was thought best to make sure of a sufficient quan-
tity at hand for the beginning of the campaign and to meet unexpected 
emergencies, and three car-loads in barrels, were ordered by the office 
to be shipped to Centralia. From here it was sent to sales agents at 
various towns thruout the infested region under an arrangement by 
which the oil, in barrels, was furnished to farmers at first cost with 
the freight charge added. The salesmen paid the company direct for 
the amounts handled by them, and my office paid the salesmen a small 
commissjon for their services. Any oil left on their hands at the close 
of the season was taken over by the office for use the following year. 
In this way supplies were made immediately accessible to the farm-
e.rs at cost, and the dealers were protected from loss with very little 
use of public funds. Except for this emergency stock, the supply of 
road oil was left to such agents as the farmers themselves had inter-
ested, with our assistance,· in various communities. Often this com-
munity service was done without compensation by some business man 
acting as purchasing and distributing agent for an organized group of · 
farmers, or, in a few cases, for all comers in his county. Many public 
meetings had been held for this purpose with the valuable aid of 
business men's associations, the farmers' institute officers in the vari-
ous counties, the local newspapers, and the like, and circulars of in-
formation, warning, and advice had been distributed in editions of 
many thousands thruout the endangered area. The fact was commonly 
realized by business men generally that the suppression of the chinch-
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bug outbreak was a community problem in which all were alike, tho . 
unequally, interested. 
Demonstration fields, on which the precise best method of prepar-
ing and caring for a chinch-bug barrier was practically illustrated, 
were, of course, an important feature in our program, and a number 
of such fi.el ds were selected by each field assistant, arrangements being 
made in advance with the owners for their proper management. These 
demonstration fields were in the neighborhood of the following eighteen 
towns: Edwardsville and Highland, in Madison county; Vandalia, 
Hagarstown, Shobonier, and Vera, in Fayette county; Fairman, Ver-
non, Patoka, and Selma ville, in Marion county; Albers, Germantown, 
and Bartelso, in Clinton; Ashley, Nashville, Oakdale, and Caspars, in 
Washington county, and Coulterville, in Randolph county. 
The season of 1911 was a very trying one for the road-oil line, the 
weather being excessively hot and the ground extremely dry, the 
months of May and June in the chinch-bug area averaging 5 degrees 
and 4.1 degrees respectively above the normal, and June and July 
temperatures rising repeatedly to 100 degrees .or more in the shade-to 
105 degrees at Sparta and Duquoin, for example, on July 4. The June 
rainfall was less than half the normal, and that for May and July was 
only a third the normal for this area. The soil in the sun was, of 
eourse, very much hotter-so hot as to make even road oil No. 6 sink 
into the dry earth much too quickly, requiring its frequent renewal at 
an increased expense for labor and materials except where the pre-
caution had been taken to make a shallow groove for the oils down 
the middle of the ridge or path. For these reasons the cost of opera-
tiomi on the· experimental and demonstration fields ran much above 
that of the preceding year, from fifty cents to $2.00 per mile per 
day for the road oil used, and from ninety cents to $3.50 per mile 
per day for labor. Even at these rates, however, the work done with 
the road oils saved so many acres of corn and oats that it was com-
monly regarded to have returned to the farmers many times its cost. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the season led us to substitute road 
oil No. 7 for No. 6 the following year, and in this we had what was 
virtually a perfect material for the purpose. -
Road-oil No. 7 in 1912.-The greater part of the area infested in 
1912 having been already covered by our demonstrations of the pre-
vious year, the use of new fields was secured for this purp()se only in 
the newly invaded territory. These were all, however, successful and 
useful. At Reno, Bond county, 'for example, a tract of forty-seven 
acres was selected in which there were fourteen acres of rye, thirteen 
acres of wheat (both the foregoing in young timothy also), twelve and 
a half acres more of wheat which was so infested by chinch-bugs that 
it was plowed up and sown to cow-peas, and seven and a half acres in 
oats. This tract, with corn on three sides and a part of the fourth, 
was completely surrounded by a back-furrow and coal-tar barrier, 
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June 27, and the work was continued with road oil No. 7. The pres-
ence of fresh timothy in half the field so held the chinch-bugs back in 
the stubble that the lines were kept up for twenty-six days, at the 
following expense : 
Plowing the ridge ( llh days' labor with man and team) 0 0 0 0 •••••• $ 4.50 
135 hours' labor pouring oil and tar .................. .. . 0 0 0 • • • • 27.00 
3 barrels road oil at $3.50 ....................... 0 • 0 ••••••• 0 • • • 10.50 
1 barrel coal-tar, at $4 ....... 0 0 0 •••••• 0 • • 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 • • • • • • 4.00 
Total for materials ....... 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 • 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 ••• 0 •• $14.50 
Total for labor ..... 0 ••••• 0 •• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 ••• ••• 0 • • • • 31.50 0 
--$46.00 
Co~t per day per mile: 
Materials . . ....... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 0 • 0. • • • • • .56 
La1:: or .. 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0 0 ••••• 0 0. 0 0 0 0 ••• 0 0. 0 . 0.......... 1.21 
$ 1.77 
The diminished co/:)t as compared with that of 1911 was due in part 
to the substitution of road oil No. 7 .for No. 6 and in part to the less 
trying character of the season. While the average mean temperature 
for June and July in the chinch-bug 8rea was nearly as high as in 
1911, there were no records of as much a~ 100 degrees in the shade in 
either month, and the rainfall of June a-:..lu July was above the normal 
by .58 of an inch for June and 1.68 ir.d~t·H for July instead of 2.4 
inches and 2.16 inches below the normal j11 the year preceding. The 
thicker road-oil lay much longer on the rnojster earth, with a resultant 
saving in both labor and material. On the other band, timely rains 
supported infested corn against the drain of chin<'h-bug injury so 
that even unprotected fields suffered much less than : ~1 1911. 
Altho there were no experimental or demonstration fields in Ma-
coupin county in 1912, Mr. Flint 's statement of farmers' operatioll3 
may be taken as a virtual substitute. Forty barrels of road oil No. 
7 and about twenty-five barrels of coal-tar were used in the vicinity of 
Carlinville, Plainview, and Bunker Hill. The road oil No. 7 gave 
general satisfaction,· and was evidently about as thick a substance of 
its kind as could be used to advantage. It was repeatedly noticed, 
indeed, that where No. 8 was used it could be crossed by chinch-bugs 
in the morning and the evening, when the nights were cool. It took 
from four to six times as much coal-tar as road oil No. 7 to keep up a 
given length of line. The ground was usually prepared for the road-
oil line by plowing a very shallow furrow around the field and trim-
ming this with a hoe to leave a hard level surface. The very best bar-
rier, however, was one prepared by dragging a heavy plank in the edge 
of a corn field to make a hard smooth surface, and then driving an 
empty wagon along in such a way that one of the wheels made a slight 
groove down the center of this path. Road oil poured in this groove 
made a line which lasted for twenty days with no renewal except to 
he touched . up here and there occasionally where there were small 
breaks. 
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The average cost of operation during this season for ten fields on 
different farms in Madison eounty was collected by Mr. Flint, from 
whose notes these data are abstracted. The road oil used on these 
farms averaged 4.4 barrels to the mile of line for a period of fourteen 
days-a cost of $7 per mile for the fortnight, or fifty cents per mile 
per day. The labor cost for this period was $8.40 a mile, making a 
total average expense of $1.10 per day per mile. By the maintenance 
of such barriers, half a mile of oil-line saved, in several cases, from 
ten to thjrty acres of corn from certain destruction; and in one in-
stance sixty acres of corn destroyed by chinch-bugs could easily have 
been saved by a line less than half a mile in length. 
A more comprehensive statement of the general outcome of the 
1912 campaign is contained in an article written by Prof. F. W. Scott, 
of the department of journalism in the University of Illinois, who 
made a trip of inspection thru the infested territory in July, 1912, 
to interview farmers, examine fields, and report his own unbiased 
observations on the methods and results of the work. ''The most sat-
isfactory results,'' he says,'' considering both cost and protection, have 
been obtained from a line made of No. 7 road oil, which, when prop-
erly applied, caught all the crawling bugs and was easy to maintain. 
'J'hose who followed the · directions as given in the Entomologist's 
spring circular of this year [1912] found that the road oil needed re-
newal but once in two or three days after the first two applications, 
and some lines were found to be in perfectly good condition two weeks 
after the final renewal. Coal-tar lines, on the other hand, had to be 
renewed once or twice every day, and were of course more costly both 
in labor and in actual outlay for material.'' 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN (1914) 
· The lamentable failure of the road oil furnished from vVood River 
in 1913, together with continued and extraordinary drouth in the 
chinch-bug area, tended strongly to discourage many who had made a 
determined fight during two or three years for the salvation of their 
crops. From April to August, 1913, inclusive, the daily mean tem-
peratures aggregated nearly 2000° F. above the normal for this re-
gion, and the total rainfall for these same months was deficient about 
eight and a half inches. Furthermore, the partial and very imper-
fect way in which the chinch-bugs had been met and disposed of at 
harvest-time, had left a vast and increasing horde of them to over-
whelm crops the following year; and the plague sePm.ed to be increas-
ing in virulence and destructiveness, notwithstanding all that had been 
done for its control. There was, consequently, a diminished disposi-
tion in 1914 to renew the contest in the counties which had been long-
est infested; but there was a considerable territory invaded or seri-
ously threatened by the chinch-bug in the spring of this year which 
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had never been covered by our operations, and to this we consequently 
gave principal attention. Our most important spring preparations 
covered all or the greater parts of the counties of Pike, Scott, Mor-
gan, Sangamon, Christian, Green, and Fayette, and inuch of the coun-
ties of Jersey, Madison, Macoupin, Bond, St. Clair, Montgomery, and 
Shelby. By all the agencies and devices which we had found useful in 
previous years, the people of this territory were notified, advised, in-
structed, and assisted. Public meetings were held at which the facts 
were set forth and the plan of operations was outlined; leading farm-
ers, grain dealers, and others influential and widely known among the 
farming population were interviewed; illustrated posters were put up 
in post-offices and other places of general resort; and many thousand 
circulars were distributed by mail. 
At the end of the season data were collected for a careful estimate 
of the results of the work. By a general inquiry made of those who 
had handled supplies in the counties of Montgomery, Christian, San-
gamon, Menard, Macon, Morgan, Scott, Pike, Adams, Jersey, Ma-
coupin, Greene, and Madison, it was learned that not less than 2000 
barrels of creosote and 1000 barrels of coal-tar had been used, to-
gether with considerable quantities of kerosene and salt. Further 
· inquiry enabled us to learn the average amounts of these substances 
actually used per mile of barrier, and by this means to ascertain the 
total length of barrier made and maintained for the season, and the 
total cost of the same. All uncertain items of the computation were 
estimated at the lowest reasonable figures. We were thus assured that 
at least fifteen hundred miles of barrier had been kept up in these 
counties between fields of infested wheat and adjacent fields of corn, 
at a total cost, for both materials and labor, of not more than $40,500. 
To learn what area of corn was actually protected by these bar-
rier lines, it was necessary to know the size of an average central Illi-
nois corn-field. Fortunately, a series of observations made for me by 
two assistants engaged in a survey of the bird life of the state in 1907, 
gave me this information. In crossing the state from Wabash to 
Quincy, . they traveled 71.87 miles through 362 corn fields, an average 
of 63.53 rods for each field. Virtually all central Illinois corn-fields 
being rectangular, the average form of a sufficient number is that of 
a square, and the average size by the above data is 25.2 acres. In 
other words, our fifteen hundred miles of chinch-bug barrier had 
protected from invasion the equivalent of a belt of corn fields 63.5 
rods wide and fifteen hundred miles long-an area of 190,590 acres. 
The average yield of corn per acre in ten central Illinois counties not 
infested by chinch-bugs in 1914 was 30.8 bushels. It was the best 
judgment of my field assistants, supported by that of well-informed 
farmers, that 25 bushels per acre was a very moderate estimate for the 
yield of the protected corn-fields, and it was also the general opinion 
that at least a fourth of this yield was due to measures of protection 
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against injury by chinch-bugs. At these rates the total product of the 
protected area was 4,764,750 bushels, and the saving by protection was 
1,191,187 bushels, worth, at 60 cents a bushel, the ordinary price for 
the season, $714,712. As the cost of protection was $40,500, the net . 
profit for the total operation was $67 4,212, a ratio of 1665 percent on 
the investment. 
This result was obtained by making barriers, as a rule, along only 
one side of infested wheat-fields. If each such field had been wholly 
surrounded, the expense, of course, would have been four times as 
great, or approximately $162,000, but the net profit even then would 
have been 342 percent on the cost of labor and materials. Indeed, if 
the like had been done by every owner of a badly infested wheat-field 
in this area, the total profit would have been much increased, since both 
corn and oats would have been protected, not only against direct in-
vasion from infested wheat but against a general infestation follow-
ing when the chinch-bugs allowed to escape from the wheat came to 
maturity and scattered on the wing. These figures show not only the 
-great advantage of wholesale operations against the chinch-bug at har-
vest-time, but the essential reasonableness of the requirement that all 
dangerously infested fields of small grains shall be so handled by their 
owners that insects shall not escape from them to the injury of the 
owner himself and of his entire community. I am strongly of the 
opinion that if we had been in a position to make a requirement of 
this kind in 1910, and if we had then known all that we have now 
learned concerning the best methods and materials for use against 
the chinch-bug at harvest-time, it would have been quite possible so 
to reduce the numbers of chinch-bugs that year that there would have 
been no appreciable overflow the following year, and hence no north-
ward expansion of the area of infestation. In other words, it seems to 
me quite possible to throttle a chinch-bug outbreak in this state in the 
beginning by active scouting in fall and spring to determine its limits 
and to locate dangerously infested fields, and by well-organized, 
prompt, general, and concerted action, ·especially with barriers and 
lines of post-hole traps around infested fields of small grains, with the 
addition of insecticide sprays wherever special conditions call for their 
use. 
THE LEGISLATivE; REMEDY 
The statement has been repeatedly made in the foregoing discus-
sion that we have found it quite impossible to induce the average farm-
er, or even the farmer of the highest grade, to do his best at harvest-
time for the destruction of all the chinch-bugs escaping from his fields 
of wheat; but unless this is done it will be forever impossible to put a 
controlling check upon chinch-bug uprisings. The fatal difficulty lies 
in the fact, obvious to every one, that the individual farmer will not 
incur the trouble and expense of destroying his chinch-bugs for the 
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benefit of his community unless he knows that the other members of 
the community will. do the same. 
The situation is essentially like that presented several years ago 
when the prosperity of fruit culture-its profitable continuance even 
-were threatened by an invasion by a destructive foreign insect 
known as the San Jose scale. This emergency was met in Illinois and in 
most other American states by making it the duty of all growers of 
horticultural products to keep their premises free from insect and fun- · 
gus pests of eve~y description which are liable to spread to the prop-
erty of .others, and enforcing this requirement by appropriate penal-
ties. Legislation of this character has not only put it within the power 
and made it the duty of some state official-in Illinois the State Ento-
mologist-to protect endangered property-by legal process if neces-
sary-but it has acted powerfully to impress the public concerned with 
a sense of their duty in the premises, and through the resulting publi-
cations of the entomologist's office, the agricultural papers, and the 
like, to instruct the people thoroly in a whole class of subjects of 
which they would otherwise have remained in ignorance to their own 
great loRs and to that of their communities and of the country at large. 
Influenced by these considerations I sent out, in January, 1915, 
the following letter to twenty-nine prominent farmers residing in 
districts badly injured by the chinch-bug the preceding year, and to 
three other persons officially cognizant of the facts. 
''An outbreak of the chinch-bug in Illinois, which began in a few 
southwestern counties in 1910, has now reached a crisis which forcibly 
illustrates our helplessness against a considerable class of destructive 
raids of the insect pests of agriculture because we are not able to se-
cure, by any means now available, sufficiently general action by 
farmers concerned to get the benefit of cooperative measures. The 
actual loss last year (1914) in corn alone, due to the chinch-bug, 
amounted, for Illinois, to not less. than $2,700,000,* and there is at 
present a prospect of a much more extensive infestation during 1915. 
''The chinch-bug breeds, as you doubtless know, in two generations, 
the first mainly in wheat and the second mainly in corn. The first 
generation, hatching from eggs laid in spring, has not yet got its wings 
at the time of the wheat harvest, and hence must leave the stubble 
fields on foot to find fresh pastures in corn, oats, and forage grasses. 
It can be stopped, trapped, and destroyed by barriers and traps laid 
down at the borders of the infested wheat-fields at a usual cost, for 
the season, of less than ten dollars a mile in money and an additional 
ten to twenty dollars a mile in farm labor; and every insect so dis-
posed of at this time is ordinarily equivalent to a hundred times as 
many of the next generation which would hatch from eggs laid in the 
eorn. 
*This estimate was far too small. The actual loss was more than $5,000,000. 
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'' \V e have succeeded in the past year in inducing very many 
farmers to protect their corn against direct invasion from infested 
wheat-fields (where corn and wheat lie side by side), by placing and 
maintaining one of the trap and barrier lines between the corn and 
the wheat at harvest-time, with the result that, in thirteen central 
Illinois counties, corn worth $804,000* was saved at an expense of 
$40,500 to the- farmers for materials and labor, and of $1933 to the 
State. The average farmer, however, will not entirely surround an 
infested wheat-field in a way to capture all its insect inhabitants, es-
pecially for the reason that this would be of no appreciable benefit to 
himself unless his neighbors generally do the same ; and if he has no 
corn or oats beside his wheat, he will do nothing at all. The conse-
quence is that the bugs move out of the infested wheat in at least 
three directions, even if they are headed off and trapped in one; and 
those escaping presently get their full growth, scatter everywhere on 
the wing, infest the corn and other crops of the whole country-side, 
and there feed and lay their eggs almost as if nothing at all had been· 
done. Persons able and ready to destroy all the bugs of the first gen-
eration bred in their own fields, will not do so when they know that 
thei.r neighbors are breeding vast hordes of them and allowing them 
to escape to destroy everything a little later. 
, ''We are thus compelled to seek means of securing general action 
such as will give every person concerned a reasonable assurance that 
all others will do their duty by the community. To this end it has 
been suggested that the legislature be asked to pass a law making it 
the duty of every person having a field of small grain dangerously 
infested by chinch-bugs to take the measures necessary to prevent 
their escape to the injury of the property of others, with a proviso 
that this law shall take effect only when and where a proclamation by 
the Governor of the State may direct. The chinch-bug is but one of 
several insect pests of the farm whose control and destruction present 
the same practical problem, and any such law should be drawn in 
terms, consequently, to apply to all similar cases. The principle in-
volved, I may say, is already well recognized in our various. state 
quarantine laws, and especially in our state law intended to operate 
against the spread of the San Jose scale and other dangerous and 
destructive pests of horticulture. 
"I should be much pleased to have your opinion of the desirability 
of such legislation at the present time, and as full an expression of 
your views upon the situation generally as you may be willing to 
give.'' 
Sixteen replies to these letters were received, ten favorable to the 
proposed legislation, three favorable to the principle but doubtful of 
its practicability, and three simply uncertain or non-committal. As 
only a third of those addressed expressed a positively favorable opin-
*This should have been $715,000. 
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ion, and as there was not sufficient time-the legislature being al-
ready in session-for a campaign of explanation and argument, it 
seemed best to lay the project aside for the time, and to bring it for-
ward, as I am now doing, as a sequel to a full description of the con-
ditions which it is proposed to remedy. 
SUMMARY 
A destructive outbreak of the chinch-bug, the first beginnings of 
which were seen in Illinois in the fall of 1909, continued with growing 
intensity and gradually widening area until the spring of 1915, when 
it suddenly collapsed. 
A careful computation of losses resulting, based upon a comparison 
of crop yields and crop conditions in seventeen infested and seven-
teen uninfested counties, shows that the yield of corn, wheat, and oats 
in these infested counties was diminished by chinch-bug infestation in 
the year 1914 as follows: corn, $5,045,874; wheat, $1,356,039; oats, 
$41,071-a total of $6,442,984. Taking further account of losses in 
. six other counties in 1914, and in the five other years of the period 
of the outbreak, $13,000,000 is arrived at as the lowest reasonable esti-
mate of the total immediate loss in these three staple crops. Secondary 
effects of the outbreak are illustrated by a comparison of statistics of 
'live-stock production in four infested and four uninfested counties, 
showing that beef and dairy cattle of the four infested counties fell 
off in numbers to a value of nearly half a million dollars, as a plain 
consequence of the destruction of crops by chinch-bugs. 
An analysis of the weather and other conditions for several years 
in the region where the chinch-bug outbreak began, points to a con-
elusion that the immediate cause of its beginning was unusually hot 
midsummer weather, with no excessive rainfall, occurring in a region 
in which the food plants occupied a relatively large area, with winter 
wheat in especially large ratio. There was also convincing evidence 
that the extension of the outbreak from the area occupied in 1910 was 
in the nature of an overflow from the heavily infested territory, the 
direction of which was governed in part by the cropping of the adja-
cent territory but in great measure also by the direction of the prevail-
ing winds at times when the insects were on the wing, especially in 
spring when emerging from hibernation and in fall when in search of 
winter quarters. These flights commonly occurring on warm sunny 
days when the winds are from southerly and westerly directions, the 
~ chinch-bugs were carried mainly to the north and east with a result-
ing extension of the area of infestation, year after year, in those di-
rections . . The outbreak was brought to a conclusion in the spring and 
early summer of 1915 by heavy beating and flooding rains coming at 
times when the young bugs were hatching rapidly from the egg. 
The principal measures for the control of a chinch-bug outbreak 
are the burning out of the insects in their winter quarters and th~ir 
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destruction at harvest time by means of impassable barriers and linBs 
of post-hole traps placed beside infested fields of wheat. Altho winter 
burning on a large scale proved impracticable in Illinois owing to wet 
and snowy winters, small-scale field experiments with this operation, 
under conditions locally and temporarily favorable, destroyed from 
50 to 75 percent of the chinch-bugs under the harborage burned over. 
·With a view to finding a better material than coal-tar for making 
the barriers against the escape of chinch-bugs at wheat harvest, many 
experiments were made in Illinois, in Texas, and in Arizona, with 
various more or less similar substances, resulting in the selection 
of a petroleum product, a residue of distillation, containing 70 
percent of asphaltic materials and known as road oil No. 7. 
This was virtually a perfect substance for its purpose, lasting from 
five to ten or more times as long as coal-tar, without renewal. It had 
the disadvantage, however, that it was not on the mark~t, and must 
be made at Whiting, I nd., solely lor this special use; must conse-
quently be ordered some time in advance; and because of the delays 
in transportation, was frequently received after the emergency for 
which it was needed had passed. An attempt to secure the same re-
sults with a road oil of the same composition made at a refinery within 
th~ infested district resulted disastrously because of the different ·phy-
sical qualities of this road oil, due to the different character of the 
crude oil supplied to this refinery. 
A farmer's chance experiment made in 1912 showed that crude 
creosote was almost as effective as coal-tar or the road oils. It had 
the advantage that it could always be obtained without delay in any 
desired quantity and from near-by sources of supply; and this was the 
substance principally used during the last year or two of the outbreak. 
Experiments showed that creosote differed from coal-tar and the road 
oils in the cause of its effectiveness, the latter being impassable be-
cause they were thick and sticky, and the creosote r epelling the in-
sects by the odorous vapors given off. 
Field experiments with practical operations, especially in 1910, 
1911 ~ and 1912, showed that an effective barrier could be made and 
maintained at an expense for labor and materials varying from $1.50 
to · $2 per day per mile, the difference depending mainly upon the 
character of the season. 
Under certain conditions it is desirable to kill chinch-bugs by means 
of an insecticide spray. Kerosene emulsion, in use for this purpose 
since 1882, being difficult to prepare and dangerous to the plants 
unless very carefully used, experiments were made to find other more 
satisfactory substances, with the result that a tobacco extract known 
as Black Leaf 40 was found highly effective in ratios of half an ounce 
to a gallon of water in which half an ounce of soap had been dissolved. 
l!1urther experiments showed that soap solutions alone, three ounces 
to the gallon of water, were almost equally useful. 
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Data obtained concerning the results of the final campaign of 
1914 showed that in thirteen counties of west-central Illinois two 
thousand barrels of creosote and a thousand barrels of coal-tar were 
used, together with coru!iderable quantities of other materials, and that 
at least fifteen hundred miles of barrier were maintained in these coun-
ties at a total cost of $40,500 for materials and labor, with the result 
to protect against injury by chinch-bug corn fields aggregating 
190,590 acres and yielding 4,764,750 bushels of corn, a fourth of which 
yield, worth $715,000, was due to the protective measures. This was a 
net profit of $674,212 on an investment of $40,500, a ratio of 1665 per-
cent. If each infested wheat field had been wholly surrounded, the 
profit would still have Leen 342 percent on the cost of labor ana ma-
terials. 
Since it has proven impossible to induce farmers to surround in-
fested fields at harvest time with impassable barriers and lines of 
traps, owing to the fact that the benefit of this complete operation de-
pends upon its performance by all owners of infested fields, legislation 
is proposed similar to that in force for the control of the San Jose 
scale and other pests of horticulture, but applying to chinch-bugs, 
army-worms, Hessian flies, and a considerable series of insect pests 
of agriculture, the effective control of which requires -community ac-
tion. It is advised that any law of this character should be given 
effect only by a proclamation of the Governor, based upon information 
given him by the State Entomologist, and specifying the territory, 
time, and extent to which th& law shall apply. 
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FIG. 1. Field with growth of bunch-grass (Andropogon). FIG. 2. Growth of bun~h-grass (Andropogon virginicum). 
FIG. 3. Incompletely burned crowns of bnnch-grass (An-
d?·opogon). 
FIG. 4. Sumacs along fence, providing winter quarters for 
chinch-bugs. 
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Fra. 5. Road-oil line around a field of wheat nearly destroyed by chinch-bugs. Note the perfect condition 
of the corn field beside the wheat. 
FIG. 6. An unprotected corn field, 1912. The chinch- bugs entered it from the :field of wheat, a little of 
which is shown in the foreground. 
FIG. 7. A protected corn :field, 1912. Road-oil and post-hole traps between the corn and the wheat, by 
which millions of the bugs were caught. 
